Take a different look: how concrete and abstract mindsets affect individuals' judgments and decisions by Jaffé, Mariela Elena
 Original document stored on the publication server of the University of Basel 
edoc.unibas.ch 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Take a Different Look: How Concrete and Abstract Mindsets Affect 
Individuals’ Judgments and Decisions 
 
 
 
 
Inaugural Dissertation 
 
 
 
In partial fulfillment of the requirements  
 
for the degree of 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
Submitted to the 
 
Faculty of Psychology  
 
University of Basel 
 
 
by 
 
 
Mariela Elena Jaffé 
 
born in Vienna, Austria 
 
 
Basel, 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Take a Different Look                    Page 2 
 
 
 
 
Approved by the Faculty of Psychology 
at the request of  
Prof. Dr. Rainer Greifeneder and Prof. Dr. Nira Liberman 
 
 
 
 
Basel, 22.03.2018 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________ 
Prof. Dr. Roselind Lieb (Dean) 
 
 
 
Take a Different Look                    Page 3 
 
 
Declaration 
 
I, Mariela E. Jaffé (born May 24th, 1986 in Vienna, Austria), hereby declare that I have written 
the submitted doctoral thesis “Take a Different Look: How Concrete and Abstract Mindsets 
Affect Individuals’ Judgments and Decisions” without any assistance from third parties not 
indicated. 
 
(I) My cumulative dissertation is based on three manuscripts, one in revision and two submitted. 
I certify here that the articles in this dissertation concern original work. I contributed 
substantially and independently to all manuscripts in this dissertation with respect to the ideas, 
data collection, analyses, and writing of the manuscripts, which is reflected in me being first 
author. This characterization of my contributions is in agreement with my co-authors’ views. 
 
(II) I only used the resources indicated. 
 
(III) I marked all the citations. 
 
 
Basel, ____________________ 
__________________________ 
Mariela E. Jaffé 
 
 
Take a Different Look                    Page 4 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
During my PhD I was lucky to be supported and accompanied by a lot of people, without whom 
I could not have completed this work:  
I would like to thank my supervisor Rainer Greifeneder for his continuous support and advice 
during the last four years. I am also very grateful to Nira Liberman for fruitful discussions at 
different conferences and for agreeing to be part of my PhD committee. 
I would further like to thank my collaborators, colleagues, and my research assistants, who 
continuously discussed research with me and helped me with their knowledge and ideas. Last 
but not least, I would like to thank my family and friends for reminding me about all the abstract 
and concrete ways of looking at life, without always having my research on my mind.  
Take a Different Look                    Page 5 
 
 
Abstract 
Taking a different look or a new perspective, studying a problem from afar or close up can 
affect individuals’ judgment and decision-making. Construal Level Theory argues that 
depending on whether individuals construe on a more abstract (higher) versus more concrete 
(lower) level, they will attend to different pieces of information, which may result in different 
outcomes. This dissertation builds on Construal Level Theory and uncovers open questions 
concerning judgments of truth, diversity, dishonesty, and the use of decision-making aids. It 
aims at offering answers to these questions, which have so far not been considered from a 
Construal Level Theory perspective. Jaffé and Greifeneder (2017) find that the negativity bias 
regarding judgments of truth might attenuate or even reverse under high compared to low 
construal level. Looking at diversity, Jaffé, Rudert, and Greifeneder (2017) show that 
individuals might appreciate working with a dissimilar other under high construal level, but 
prefer a more similar counterpart under low construal level. Looking at dishonest behavior, 
Jaffé, Greifeneder, and Reinhard (2017) highlight that Machiavellianism has a stronger impact 
under high compared to low construal level. Finally, Jaffé, Reutner, and Greifeneder (2017) 
look at decision-making aids and provide support for the notion that a simple device like a 
coin flip might catalyze decisions, allowing for more affect-driven decisions where 
individuals might have been undecided before. In sum, the research projects of this 
dissertation advance our knowledge in regards to how and in which contexts abstract and 
concrete mindsets affect individuals’ judgments and decisions. 
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Preface 
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framework is to place the single manuscripts within the bigger scope of my research program 
and highlight interrelations between the manuscripts. 
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(1) Jaffé, M. E. & Greifeneder, R. (2017). Negative is true here and now, but not so 
much there and then: On the impact of psychological distance on the negativity bias. 
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(2) Jaffé, M. E., Greifeneder, R., & Reinhard, M.-A. (2017). Manipulating the odds: 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
We live in a complex and challenging environment that requires us to make a 
multitude of decisions every day. When should I get up in the morning? Would it be better to 
eat cereal or toast for breakfast? Or should I skip breakfast to be a bit earlier in the office and 
get some extra work done? And when arriving in the office should I first start working on my 
emails or finish the presentation that I have been postponing for days? Or, putting important 
things first, maybe I should finally mail that application for the new and exciting job 
opportunity in a different city? In all of these situations, individuals need to make decisions, 
which range from having only little impact on their life (such as the choice of breakfast) to 
being associated with severe changes (such as deciding to go for a new job in a new city). 
Some of these decisions are made in seconds, such as when shopping for groceries for 
breakfast under time pressure. Other decisions may require taking time, as individuals need to 
ponder every advantage or disadvantage that the new job may offer. In both cases the question 
arises of which aspects individuals take into account to make these decisions. 
To navigate through daily life, and more specifically, to make these fast or profound 
decisions, individuals need to process information in their environment (Greifeneder, Bless, & 
Fiedler, 2018; Rateau, Moliner, Guimelli, & Abric, 2011). They need to process information 
about food options for breakfast, or about the potential implications of moving away to pursue 
a new career. By processing information, individuals make sense of their surroundings 
(Rateau et al., 2011). Simply put, individuals selectively attend to certain details and allot 
meaning to this information (Greifeneder et al., 2018). Individuals can differ inter- but also 
intra-individually in how and to which pieces of information they attend, and they can differ 
in regards to their processing style (e.g., Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996; McElroy 
& Seta, 2003). 
From a social psychologist’s point of view, a multitude of research has already been 
conducted that attempts to provide answers to the question of how individuals process 
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information and how individuals’ processing styles impact affect, cognition, and behavior 
(e.g., Förster & Dannenberg, 2010; Kahneman, 2011; Petty & Cacioppo, 1984, 1986; Trope & 
Liberman, 2003). Historically, the first models have investigated whether (and under which 
conditions) individuals process information more or less thoroughly. These dual processing 
models generally postulate two distinct systems or modes and compare effortful to not so 
thorough processing by, for example, using shortcuts. One famous model was introduced by 
Kahneman (2011), which differentiates between a System 1 and System 2 processing system. 
While System 1 is described as an automatic, fast, unconscious way of thinking, which is 
mostly based on heuristics (e.g., How do I actually feel about the new job), the processing 
style of System 2 is slower, more effortful, and more conscious and thorough (e.g., What are 
the advantages and disadvantages of taking a new job right now, Kahneman, 2011). Similarly, 
in the Elaboration-Likelihood-Model, another dual-process model focusing on persuasion, 
Petty and Cacioppo (1984, 1986) differentiate between a peripheral route and a central route 
of information processing. When individuals process along the peripheral route, they attend to 
more superficial information such as the number of arguments, while when they process along 
the central route, they much rather attend to the content or validity of the arguments. Once 
again, a more superficial and effortless processing style is opposed by a more profound 
processing style that requires a higher degree of involvement and capacity.  
Newer models offer a complementary approach and shift attention more to individuals’ 
perspective on their environment: Do individuals look at the environment holistically or do 
they focus on specific details? A highly influential model within this group is Construal Level 
Theory (Liberman & Trope, 2008; Trope & Liberman, 2003, 2010). In a nutshell, Construal 
Level Theory claims that depending on the mindset (the construal level), individuals attend to 
different pieces of information. Individuals can have a rather abstract mindset or a more 
concrete mindset, which influences whether they would focus more on the gist of information 
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(e.g., Is this the job that will allow me to fulfill my goals?) or on specific details regarding a 
target or event (e.g., Can I start on that date to make moving easier?). 
All in all, this brief overview of exemplary models shows that individuals’ processing 
style will influence which pieces of information individuals will attend to or think of when 
making a decision. As a consequence, their processing style is highly important for 
subsequent judgments and decisions. This present work will build on Construal Level Theory 
(Trope & Liberman, 2010) as a theory of explaining information processing and its influence 
on affect, cognition, and behavior. The theory and a selection of current research findings will 
be summarized in Chapter 2. However, the vast and versatile body of literature on Construal 
Level Theory still calls for further and innovative research to test its predictions and broad 
applicability regarding diverse questions. Depending on individuals’ construal level, 
individuals might not only focus more on the gist of information versus specific details, but 
perhaps also more on positive or negative aspects. Would individuals with a different 
construal level therefore deem a statement more or less likely to be true when framed 
positively compared to negatively? Furthermore, when individuals focus more or less on the 
desirability or feasibility of an action, could this explain why individuals sometimes prefer 
diversity and sometimes similarity in groups? And how influential are values on the 
occurrence of honest versus dishonest behavior, depending on individuals’ mindsets? Finally, 
could the usage of decision-making aids and the potentially associated shift in processing 
style allow individuals to make decisions in cases where they were undecided before? 
Different research and dissertation projects will be highlighted in Chapter 3 that make a 
significant contribution to finding answers to these open and important questions about 
judgments of truth, diversity of work groups, dishonest behavior, and aiding judgment and 
decision-making. Implications for research and practice are discussed in Chapter 4 and 5. The 
arguments presented will then allow for an overall conclusion in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 2: Construal Level Theory as a Theoretical Background 
Construal Level Theory starts from the assumption that individuals live in the here-
and-now, but can psychologically traverse distance by thinking about today or the future, here 
or a faraway place, themselves or different others, with certainty or only a slight probability 
(Liberman & Trope, 2008). The reference point for this mental travelling is the “me, here, and 
now” (Trope & Liberman, 2010, p. 457) and depending on how far away an object, event or 
person is from this point it is more or less psychologically distant. Hence, taking a new job a 
year from now is psychologically more distant than starting a new job today; similarly, a job 
in another country would be psychologically more distant than a job in the city a person is 
currently living in. Most importantly, Construal Level Theory maintains that changes in 
psychological distance are closely associated with the level on which objects and events are 
mentally construed: psychological distance impacts individuals’ perspectives and therefore 
their processing styles (Liberman & Trope, 2008; Trope & Liberman, 2003). 
Level of construal is defined as the mental representation or mindset of individuals. 
Individuals can have high level construals that are (compared to low level construals) 
relatively abstract, coherent, and superordinate mental representations. These representations 
retain the central features of an object (e.g., in the case of the concept “job”, for example, the 
content and associated responsibilities), and omit features that might be deemed more 
incidental (e.g., the color of the equipment in the office). Low level construals (compared to 
high level construals), would be more concrete representations, which include more details or 
contextual information (Trope & Liberman, 2010). Two aspects need to be taken into 
consideration. First, it is important to note that individuals construe on a continuum between 
very concretely to very abstractly and not in a dichotomy of either high or low construal level 
(Trope & Liberman, 2010). Second, although information may be omitted when moving to 
higher level construals, this does not mean that more abstract representations are more vague 
or impoverished. Instead, high level construals include other information about the general 
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meaning and the valence or value of the stimulus (Semin & Fiedler, 1988; Trope & Liberman, 
2010). 
 Connecting both the concept of psychological distance and level of construal, 
Construal Level Theory points out that psychologically distant objects or entities are 
construed at a higher level and psychologically more proximal entities at a lower level 
(Liberman & Trope, 2008; Trope & Liberman, 2010). Therefore, psychological distance 
impacts construal level1. Construal level then influences which pieces of information 
individuals take into account and may influence their affective, cognitive, and behavioral 
reactions (e.g., Bruehlman-Senecal & Ayduk, 2015; Eyal, Liberman, Trope, & Walther, 2004; 
Eyal, Sagristano, Trope, Liberman, & Chaiken, 2009; Fujita & Han, 2009; Fujita, Trope, 
Liberman, & Levin-Sagi, 2006). 
Going back to the example: When thinking about mailing an application for a new job, 
individuals need to imagine a future scenario. This scenario might include new roles and 
responsibilities, meaning new work content, but also other information about a new city, a 
new workplace, a new apartment, eventually leaving behind family and friends as well as 
well-established routines such as the weekly running appointment with a colleague. 
Individuals cannot directly experience this scenario, as they only directly experience the here 
and now (Trope & Liberman, 2010). However, individuals can make plans and predictions, 
and these could critically differ depending on psychological distance (e.g., when would the 
job start) and construal level (e.g., am I thinking about the job more abstractly or concretely).  
This means that depending on individuals’ more abstract or concrete mindset, they will look 
at different aspects of this “new job scenario”. Individuals will, for example, likely focus 
more on (a) superordinate compared to subordinate information, (b) the desirability compared 
                                                      
1 Construal level may also affect perceived distance, such as objects construed on a higher level are connected to 
other objects that span a wider range in time (Liberman & Trope, 2008). However, in this dissertation I focus on 
distance as a major determinant of construal level (unless construal level is manipulated directly, as will be 
illustrated below) and the impact of construal level on subsequent judgments and decisions. 
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to the feasibility of taking the new job, (c) are more, compared to less influenced by values 
and beliefs, and (d) possess more, compared to less self-control. These four aspects will be 
detailed below. 
2.1 Superordinate Versus Subordinate Information 
When individuals construe on a high level, they focus on central and goal-related 
features (labeled as high level features). When construing on a lower level, individuals 
additionally take more peripheral, contextual, and more goal-irrelevant features into account 
(labeled as low level features; Trope & Liberman, 2010). A hierarchy of information is 
constituted: central or high level features have greater impact on the meaning of an object or 
event, compared to more incidental, low level features. Accordingly, “changing a high level 
feature has a greater impact on the meaning of an object than does changing a low level 
feature” (Trope & Liberman, 2010, p. 441). This leads to differences in importance: central or 
high level features are superordinate, as they constitute the meaning of an object or event, and 
lower level features subordinate, as they are considered as more incidental or detailed 
information (Trope & Liberman, 2010). Depending on the psychological distance and the 
respective construal level, individuals may therefore focus more strongly on superordinate 
information, or take into account subordinate information, too. 
 These mechanisms can be illustrated with a study by Trope and Liberman (2000; 
Study 2), which fittingly investigated the exemplary context of job choices. Here, participants 
read job descriptions and were asked how much they would like to start working in the job. 
Within the job descriptions the authors varied whether the superordinate attribute, the job 
content, was interesting or not interesting, and whether a more subordinate attribute, some 
job-related training, was interesting or not interesting. Participants primed with a higher 
construal level (by making the decision for the future, which is psychologically more distant) 
had a stronger preference for the interesting job with uninteresting training, while this 
preference attenuated for participants primed with a low construal level (by making decisions 
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for tomorrow, which is psychologically closer). Participants who decided for the future, 
compared to participants who decided for tomorrow, apparently weighed the central, 
superordinate information more strongly (for another example in the context of evaluating 
essays, see Liviatan, Trope, & Liberman, 2008). 
Construal Level Theory’s assumptions on the centrality of information also apply to 
arguments in favor of or against an action (Trope & Liberman, 2010). The theory holds that 
arguments in favor are superordinate to arguments against something, as the subjective 
importance of cons depends on whether or not pros are present more than the reverse (Eyal et 
al., 2004; Herzog, Hansen, & Wänke, 2007). Common examples are medical treatments: Only 
if a medical treatment seems beneficial (has pros) might one consider and discuss the 
potential negative side effects (cons). If no benefits are apparent (no pros), potential side 
effects seem irrelevant instead (Trope & Liberman, 2010). Therefore, pro-arguments are 
considered to be superordinate, and con-arguments subordinate. The conceptual hierarchy of 
information matters when construing on a high level (i.e., in abstract terms, as here 
individuals focus on the superordinate features), but not when construing on a low level (as 
here individuals focus on both the superordinate and the subordinate features). Translated to 
the variable of valence, Construal Level Theory asserts that positive (more superordinate) 
compared to negative (more subordinate) information might gain in relative weight with 
increasing abstractness or higher level mindsets (e.g., Williams, Stein, & Galguera, 2014). 
Further evidence in support of this reasoning shows, for instance, that the mental salience of 
positive and societal outcomes of an action increases as social distance increases, and that 
framing persuasive messages in terms of gains compared to losses becomes more powerful 
when participants make judgments for socially distant versus proximal entities (Nan, 2007). 
However, only little research has investigated this differential weighing of positive 
(superordinate) and negative (subordinate) information in regard to different outcome 
variables, for example, judgments of truth, and open questions remain. Would individuals 
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with a high compared to low construal level deem a statement more or less likely to be true 
when framed positively compared to negatively? The first project of this dissertation (3.1) 
aims to analyze the influence of positive and negative information in judgments of truth. 
2.2 Desirability Versus Feasibility Related Information 
 Construal level does not only impact the focus on superordinate versus subordinate 
information, depending on their mindset individuals can also attend more to desirability 
concerns or feasibility concerns when looking at actions or behaviors (Trope & Liberman, 
2003). When thinking about the new job one might look at its desirability, how much it could 
advance one’s career or how interesting the new position could be. By contrast, feasibility 
concerns could dominate one’s thoughts, such as moving to a new place, leaving behind one’s 
old job, friends, and eventually family, which could be less convenient. Construal Level 
Theory argues that when construing on a high level, individuals focus more on desirability 
concerns, as they involve the value of the action’s end state and are therefore considered a 
superordinate piece of information. When construing on a low level, individuals should also 
take feasibility concerns into account, as they involve the means used to reach the end state 
and constitute a more subordinate piece of information (Liberman & Trope, 1998; Trope & 
Liberman, 2010).  
 Accordingly, the differential consideration of desirability versus feasibility is 
influenced by construal level and/or psychological distance, as exemplified by a recent study 
(Halamish & Liberman, 2017). Participants were told that they would sample playing cards 
from two different decks—either tomorrow or a year later. After sampling, participants would 
choose a deck, from which a card with a monetary bonus or penalty would be drawn that will 
then determine their compensation. In this scenario, sampling a lot of cards could be 
considered as desirable behavior, because it allowed participants to make a better-informed 
choice. Sampling more cards could also be considered as a behavior with relatively low 
feasibility, because it was associated with more time and more effort. The authors could show 
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that when deciding for the future (psychologically distant, associated with a more abstract 
mindset), individuals indicated the wish to sample a larger numbers of cards, presumably as 
they weighed desirability concerns more strongly than feasibility concerns. Conversely, when 
deciding for tomorrow (psychologically close, associated with a more concrete mindset), 
individuals indicated the wish to sample a smaller numbers of cards, presumably as they 
weighed feasibility concerns more strongly than desirability concerns. The consequences of 
the differential weighing of desirability versus feasibility concerns can be manifold for our 
society, as following social norms might be a desirable behavior that at the same time comes 
with a cost for the individual (Liberman & Trope, 1998). This dilemma between egalitarian 
standards and norms on the one hand versus individual costs on the other, might be fruitful 
grounds to answer questions related to diversity research. In general individuals might agree 
that diversity and inclusion of diverse others is an important aspect of an open society, but 
when being personally affected individuals might still prefer working with a more similar 
counterpart. In section 3.2 I will present some research, which is not a project of this 
dissertation but still ongoing work, that aims at shedding light on this dilemma: Why do 
individuals sometimes prefer diversity and sometimes similarity in groups?  
2.3 The Impact of Values on Subsequent Behavior 
Not only desirability and feasibility concerns may guide one’s decisions and 
behaviors, but also one’s values and beliefs. Values are concepts or beliefs; they pertain to 
desirable behaviors and transcend specific situations (Schwartz, 1992). Values guide the 
selection or evaluation of behaviors (Schwartz, 1992), and predict a broad range of 
meaningful decisions and behaviors (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; Sagiv & Schwartz, 2004). 
According to Construal Level Theory, values are abstract, decontextualized, superordinate 
cognitive structures and as such constitute high level features (Eyal, Liberman, & Trope, 
2009). Values and belief systems serve generally as high level behavioral guides (Trope & 
Liberman, 2010), and should therefore “be more readily applied to and guide intentions for 
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psychological distant situations” (Trope & Liberman, 2010, p. 453). When thinking about a 
potential job offer, a career choice should be more likely to be influenced by one’s values 
when thinking about an offer in a year from now compared to tomorrow, where other 
considerations (such as travel distance or benefit packages) might dominate. 
Along these lines, Eyal, Sagristano, Trope, Liberman, and Chaiken (2009) showed that 
values had a greater impact on how individuals plan their distant future compared to their near 
future. When planning for the distant future values and behavioral intentions correlate more 
strongly, while this relation is attenuated when individuals plan for the close future (Eyal, 
Sagristano, et al., 2009). These findings are corroborated by the findings that participants in 
an abstract mindset compared to a concrete mindset tend to behave more honestly (given that 
most people value honesty) – except for situations in which dishonesty serves the greater 
good of another party and therefore other values, such as benevolence, were more salient 
(Rixom & Mishra, 2014). In both cases, participants’ behavior seemed to be impacted more 
strongly by their values when they were primed to be in an abstract compared to a concrete 
mindset. Further research has investigated consumer behavior (Fujita, Eyal, Chaiken, Trope, 
& Liberman, 2008), where product evaluation served as a dependent variable. Here, 
participants in the high level condition evaluated a DVD player more favorably when it was 
advertised as made of environmentally friendly material versus as coming with an easy to use 
manual, whereas participants’ evaluation in the low level condition did not differ. Going 
beyond the present findings, the second project presented in this dissertation (3.3) looks at 
dishonest behavior. More specifically, it investigates the influence of the value of 
Machiavellianism on the occurrence of honest versus dishonest behavior. Do Machiavellian 
tendencies translate into dishonest behavior more under high than under low construal level?  
2.4 Self-Control  
 Depending on individuals’ mindsets, values and beliefs may be more or less influential 
for actions. Another particularly promising aspect is the application of Construal Level 
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Theory to explain how people resolve conflicting alternative motivations (e.g., finally 
finishing and submitting the application for a new job versus spending a bit more time surfing 
the web). To function effectively, one needs to postpone the immediate and more gratifying 
alternative and persist in goal-directed behavior that will lead to delayed benefits (Mischel, 
Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989). The resolution of the conflict between these two opposing 
motivations requires future-oriented self-control (Mischel et al., 1989). In terms of Construal 
Level Theory, self-control requires individuals to make decisions that are consistent with 
distal, more high level goals, when being tempted by more immediate, low level rewards 
(Fujita & Carnevale, 2012; Trope & Liberman, 2010). Therefore, adopting a psychologically 
remote perspective as well as a more abstract mindset increases individuals’ ability to exercise 
self-control (Eyal, Liberman, et al., 2009), as individuals should more strongly focus on the 
central, superordinate goals (high level features) and less on more incidental, subordinate 
goals (low level features). For instance, priming individuals with a higher construal level 
compared to a lower construal level resulted in a reduced preference for immediate over 
delayed outcomes (Fujita et al., 2006). Also, when testing for physical endurance, participants 
primed with a high level of construal held on to a handgrip longer than those primed with a 
low level of construal (Fujita et al., 2006). Further studies investigated the evaluative 
associations with temptation and actual choice behavior in respect to construal level (Fujita & 
Han, 2009), where the authors showed that higher level construals made it easier for 
individuals to associate temptations with negativity. 
2.5 Psychological Distance and Construal Level  
As illustrated before, construal level influences which information individuals are 
more likely to attend to. Construal level can be primed directly (see Freitas, Gollwitzer, & 
Trope, 2004; Fujita et al., 2006), but can also be influenced by psychological distance. The 
originally defined dimensions influencing psychological distance are based on “the perception 
of when an event occurs, where it occurs, to whom it occurs, and whether it occurs“ (Trope & 
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Liberman, 2010, p. 442). The different dimensions feeding into psychological distance are 
therefore temporal distance (now versus a long time ago or far away in the future), spatial 
distance (here versus at a faraway place), social distance (me versus some foreign person), 
and hypotheticality (with certainty versus with only a small chance of occurring). These 
psychological distances are interrelated (see Bar-Anan, Liberman, Trope, & Algom, 2007; 
Fiedler, Jung, Wänke, Alexopoulos, & de Molière, 2015; Maglio, Trope, & Liberman, 2013). 
 Other articles have also highlighted that even more dimensions of psychological 
distance may exist, and these could also eventually influence construal level. Fiedler (2007) 
argues for the dimensions of informational distance (defined in terms of the amount of 
knowledge or relevant data possessed), experiential distance (defined as information being 
based on first-hand experience or second- and third-hand experiences), affective distance 
(defined as the modality or style of information presentation), and perspective distance 
(defined as the commitment and the motivational state of the decision maker). Future research 
is required to investigate whether these dimensions also impact the processing style of 
individuals by influencing their construal level. 
 Besides pointing out new dimensions of psychological distance, other lines of research 
indicate that the processing style can also be influenced by the nature of the environment, 
which is reflected in subtler, situational, or incidental cues (compared to direct manipulations 
of psychological distance and/or construal level). Mood, for instance, seems to critically 
influence individuals’ processing style, because it provides information about the 
environment. Bad mood signals insecure environments, whereas happy mood signals a benign 
environment in which individuals could be more explorative (Förster & Denzler, 2012; 
Friedman & Förster, 2010; Schwarz & Bless, 1991). One could hypothesize that individuals 
might construe on a higher level and more abstractly in benign environments, and on a lower, 
more concrete level in environments that appear insecure. In line with this hypothesis, Isen 
and Daubman (1984) showed that good (bad) mood enhanced (reduced) the breadth of 
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categorization, which could be associated with a higher (lower) level of construal. Gasper and 
Clore (2002) found a more global processing style activated in happy individuals, while sad 
individuals showed a more local processing style. All in all, research suggests that mood 
signals information about the environment and influences individuals’ processing style.  
Within the third dissertation project (3.4) we investigate whether a more specific 
environmental cue might influence and change individuals’ processing style. Within this 
project we analyze whether a simple coin flip, used as a decision-making aid, might affect the 
decision process and subsequently the type of information that is taken into account when 
making a decision. Could such a cue, which does not signal a benign or insecure environment, 
catalyze decisions by changing individuals’ processing style?   
2.6 Summary 
As described above, construal level influences whether individuals focus more on 
superordinate or subordinate information, desirability or feasibility concerns, and whether 
their behavior is guided more or less strongly by values and associated with higher or lower 
self-control. Furthermore, more or less subtle environmental cues might directly or indirectly 
affect construal level by either providing information about the environment or by directly 
impacting psychological distance and construal level. Within this overview of the literature on 
Construal Level Theory, I highlighted several open and important questions: Would 
individuals with a different construal level deem a statement more or less likely to be true 
when framed positively compared to negatively? As individuals focus more or less on the 
desirability or feasibility of an action (depending on their construal level), could this explain 
why individuals sometimes prefer diversity and sometimes similarity in groups? How 
influential are values, such as Machiavellianism, on the occurrence of honest versus dishonest 
behavior, depending on individuals’ mindsets? And finally, how could a shift in processing 
style by using a decision-making aid perhaps allow individuals to make decisions in cases 
where they were undecided before? The contribution of this dissertation to questions about 
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judgments of truth, diversity of work groups, dishonest behavior, and aiding judgment and 
decision-making will be presented in the next chapter. 
 
Chapter 3: Open Questions Regarding Construal Level Theory  
Within this dissertation I aim to find first answers to the open questions and to test 
Construal Level Theory’s predictions pertaining to the consideration of superordinate versus 
subordinate information, the desirability versus feasibility of an action, and the influence of 
values and beliefs. To this end throughout different projects or studies, we varied the 
psychological distance or primed construal level and investigated the implications on 
subsequent judgments and decisions, as described in the sections below.    
3.1 Project 1: Superordinate Versus Subordinate Information in Judgments of Truth 
  Jaffé and Greifeneder (2017) investigated how the differential weighting of negative 
(subordinate) and positive (superordinate, see section 2.1) information impacts judgments of 
truth. In this project, we built on research on the negativity bias in judgments of truth (Hilbig, 
2009, 2012), which holds that the same message is deemed more likely true when framed 
negatively compared to positively. “The likelihood for bad weather is 20%” (negative frame) 
should be more likely deemed true compared to the message “The likelihood for good 
weather is 80%” (positive frame). Presumably this is due to the higher salience and more 
thorough processing of negative compared to positive information (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, 
Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001) and that more thorough processing increases the perception of 
truth (Fiedler, 2000; also see research on the mere thought effect, Tesser, 1978). However, 
with regard to the assumptions made by Construal Level Theory, there might be more to the 
story of the negativity bias in judgments of truth. In particular, as positive information is 
considered superordinate, it should gain in weight and impact when individuals construe on a 
higher compared to lower level. Negative information should be considered more strongly, 
when construing on a lower level, as it would be considered as more subordinate information. 
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Therefore, we hypothesized that with increasing psychological distance, the negativity bias 
should be attenuated, meaning that the same information framed negatively compared to 
positively is more likely to be perceived as true in the here-and-now, but not so much in 
conditions of higher psychological distance. In the manuscript #1 attached, two studies are 
reported that provide support for this hypothesis: The negativity bias in judgments of truth is 
found under conditions of psychological proximity, but attenuates or even reverses under 
conditions of psychological distance. A third, preregistered study is suggested, to put these 
conclusions to another test. This manuscript #1 has been submitted and is awaiting review. 
3.2 Additional Research: Desirability Versus Feasibility Regarding Diversity 
 In another line of research, which is not a project of this dissertation (but a manuscript 
in preparation), but allows for a first answer to the question regarding the preference of 
different or similar others, Jaffé, Rudert and Greifeneder (2017) applied the differential 
weighing of desirability and feasibility concerns to the context of diversity research. This line 
of research was inspired by contemporary institutions’ and companies’ strong emphasis on the 
importance of diversity (Society for Human Resource Management, 2009) and their alleged 
commitment to implement it. Yet, political interventions, such as the affirmative action policy 
in the USA or the German law passed in 2016 forcing companies listed in the stock exchange 
to have 30% women in their supervisory board, provide a hint that diversity is still not 
implemented throughout organizations and companies. A concrete example could be one of 
the major American strategy consulting companies, the Boston Consulting Group (BCG). 
BCG on the one hand declares diversity as one of their core values (Boston Consulting Group, 
2017). However, when looking at the leadership team, it becomes apparent that so far only 
22% of leaders are women (Boston Consulting Group, 2017), which may hint at all the work 
that is still required to bring the value of diversity to life.  
Besides many explaining factors such as societal hurdles and restrictions, we aimed to 
provide a psychological argument based on Construal Level Theory for this mismatch 
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between stated values and current reality. This argument focuses on how managers, HR 
decision makers, and - more generally speaking - individuals per se construe the concept of 
diversity. When thinking abstractly about diversity, individuals might think of a more diverse 
team or group that offers opportunities for them, or consider a moral responsibility of 
adhering to a fair and equality-based selection policy when choosing a new member for a 
group. These are mainly desirability concerns that speak in favor of diversity. But when 
thinking more concretely about everyday work, different aspects of this story might be more 
important. Maybe when envisioning their day-to-day work in a group, individuals might think 
it could be easier to work with someone similar – someone who has studied at the same 
university, has the same background, speaks the same language, and has the same working 
habits and style. Wondering about efficiency, communication, and pleasantness of 
interactions, a more similar candidate could be preferred due to feasibility concerns. 
Depending on the mindset, individuals may therefore go for diversity due to its desirability or 
prefer similarity due to its feasibility.  
In a first study, we investigated this trade-off by asking Swiss participants to choose a 
collaboration partner for a quiz. One of the potential partners was described as dissimilar from 
the participants (a business student from Chile), and the other as similar (a Swiss psychology 
student). To manipulate psychological distance, participants were either asked to make the 
choice for themselves (psychologically close) or for another participant of the study 
(psychologically more distant; manipulation adapted from Lu, Xie, & Xu, 2013). Our results 
display a significant association between psychological distance and choice of partner. When 
choosing for somebody else, the dissimilar person was chosen more often (probably reflecting 
thoughts such as “You should go for diversity …”), whereas when choosing for oneself, the 
similar person was preferred (“… but I prefer to work with similar others”). In a second study 
participants were asked to build a study group by selecting two or three students from a 
selected set. We varied whether they would be part of this group (psychologically closer) or 
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not (psychologically more distant) and could show that the groups built were significantly 
more diverse in regards to nationality and subject of study when participants were not part of 
the group compared to when they were part of the group. These results offer a new (and 
complementary) explanation as to why intentions of promoting diversity are not always 
realized, even though managers, HR decision makers, and individuals generally agree on the 
value of diversity. This manuscript is currently in preparation. However, a preliminary 
conclusion drawn from this research could be that management and/or the government would 
need to decrease diversity-related feasibility concerns to encourage the emergence of a 
diverse workforce.  
3.3 Project 2: The Impact of Machiavellian Beliefs on Dishonest Behavior 
Looking at values such as Machiavellian beliefs, we investigated whether the 
differential influence of values on behavior could explain dishonesty in an applied setting. In 
general, honesty is a key pillar in our society (see Rosenbaum, Billinger, & Stieglitz, 2014; 
but also the value of benevolence in Schwartz, 1992), yet some (darker) values may promote 
dishonest behavior. Throughout two studies, Jaffé, Greifeneder, and Reinhard (2017) assessed 
individuals’ Machiavellian beliefs (e.g., “The best way to handle people is to tell them what 
they want to hear”, Christie & Geis, 1970) and investigated whether these would predict 
dishonest behavior, and more strongly so when individuals have a high construal mindset. 
Participants were either primed with high or low construal level and then asked to flip a coin 
and to self-report the outcome. The outcome was linked to a small bonus payment for 
themselves or a charitable organization, making it more (or eventually less) attractive to be 
dishonest about it. This measure ensures that whether or not a specific individual is being 
dishonest or honest remains unknown to the experimenter, as the outcome of the coin flip is 
only known to the participant, and only group-level deviations from chance level can be 
analyzed (Moshagen & Hilbig, 2017). An above chance winning probability indicates 
dishonesty on the group level. Consistent with the interaction hypothesis, in both studies, the 
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higher probability of receiving a bonus given self-serving conditions was associated with a 
stronger Machiavellian personality – but more so when individuals construed on a high level 
compared to a low level. The manuscript #2 attached summarizes the results of this research 
project and is currently under review. 
3.4 Project 3: Changes in Processing Style may Catalyze Decision-Making  
In the theoretical background section (Chapter 2) I hypothesized that subtle 
environmental cues, such as a coin flip used as a decision-making aid, might critically shift 
individuals’ processing style by changing the decision-making process. In general some 
research assumes that individuals by default construe on a rather high, abstract level (Navon, 
1977). A sudden increase of urgency or importance may then reduce psychological distance 
(temporal distance in case of urgency, and eventually social distance in case of importance) 
and result in a more concrete construal level. Individuals need to adjust their processing style 
as soon as the “standard procedure” is not applicable anymore.  
Individuals may benefit from changes in processing styles, especially in a situation 
where, for example, in the case of judgment and decision-making, a more abstract construal 
level does not allow for a clear decision. Imagine finally having mailed not only one but two 
job applications and, being lucky, having received two job offers. Both offers have distinct 
advantages and disadvantages, and now you are torn between options. Changing the level of 
processing might allow for a new perspective: while both options might seem equally 
attractive on a (default) high level, they might differ on a lower level. Here, changing the 
processing style might allow individuals to make a decision where they were undecided 
before. A specific cue may elicit this change. 
In everyday life, some individuals might already intuitively implement such a strategy. 
When being stuck with a difficult decision, they decide to use a decision-making aid such as a 
coin flip. From everyday experiences one knows that sometimes people simply flip a coin 
with, for example, heads standing for one option and tails for the other (Keren & Teigen, 
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2010). Based on the assumptions outlined above, I assume that this is not only a playable 
solution for unimportant decisions, but may actually be of greater relevance, even for 
complex decision scenarios. Jaffé, Reutner, and Greifeneder (2017) investigate situations in 
which individuals are asked to flip a coin, but do not necessarily have to adhere to the coin’s 
outcome. Instead, the project focuses on the phenomenon that individuals report suddenly 
having a feeling of liking or disliking the outcome of the coin toss and using this feeling to 
subsequently make their own decision (which might indeed deviate from the option that the 
coin flip suggested). According to our rationale, the coin flip allows for a decision where 
individuals were undecided (or “stuck”) before. That is, it catalyzes the decision-making 
process, presumably by changing individuals’ perspectives on the decision problem, as further 
detailed in manuscript #3 (currently in revision) and below. 
Jaffé, Reutner, and Greifeneder (2017) hypothesize that when individuals flip a coin, 
looking at the outcome may change the decision-making process. As the coin points to one 
option over the other, job A instead of job B, individuals focus on obtaining this option and 
engage in a more vivid representation of the same. By imagining how it would be to obtain 
the option, feelings related to it become more salient (individuals like or dislike the idea). 
These more salient feelings then influence subsequent decision processes. Suddenly, 
individuals do make a decision, although they apparently needed a decision-making aid 
before.  
Within the manuscript of project 3, different studies are introduced that provide 
evidence that using a catalyst (such as a coin flip, a die, or a lottery wheel) leads to stronger 
feelings, more affect-driven decisions, and that a reliance on feelings can even increase 
performance in regard to certain decision-making problems. In one of the studies, for 
example, we show that using a catalyst leads to more affect-driven decisions. To this end we 
selected a paradigm introduced by Hsee and Rottenstreich (2004) that allows differentiating 
whether a decision outcome is reached via rational calculation or affect-based valuation (see 
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also Hsee, Rottenstreich, & Xiao, 2005). In particular, when asked how much one would like 
to donate for one versus four endangered animals, individuals can look at the facts and figures 
describing the number of endangered animals (a more rational approach). But they can also 
assess their feelings towards it (How-do-I-feel-about-it?). Hsee and Rottenstreich (2004) 
provided participants with either vivid or abstract information about the number of 
endangered pandas. They observed valuation-by-affect for pictures of pandas (vivid) as 
participants donated a similar amount irrespective of the number of endangered animals, but 
valuation-by-calculation when pandas were represented as dots in a table (abstract) as 
participants donated more for four compared to one endangered animal. Our study (Study 3 in 
the manuscript attached) mimics Hsee and Rottenstreich’s (2004) abstract dot-condition to 
show valuation-by-calculation in the control group. In contrast, catalyst-participants that were 
asked to consult their feelings in reaction to a lottery wheel should be more likely to show 
valuation-by-affect even when presented with abstract information. As hypothesized, catalyst-
participants displayed a lower sensitivity towards numbers (i.e., a smaller difference between 
donation amounts for one or four animals) compared to the control group, indicating that 
using a catalyst indeed led to more affect-driven decisions. 
Going beyond the assumptions and the data provided in the manuscript, one can 
hypothesize that by flipping a coin, the ongoing decision process is changed. As individuals 
more vividly imagine obtaining the options, which results in more salient feelings, affective 
distance (Fiedler, 2007) might be decreased. Also, the decision problem is less hypothetical, 
as one option has been suggested over the other. Therefore, individuals’ processing style 
might change from a more abstract to a more concrete construal level. This change, in turn, 
may then allow for decisions, where individuals were “stuck” between alternatives before. 
The change, induced by the coin, catalyzed the decision-making process.  
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3.5 Summary 
All projects and studies described previously investigate this interplay of processing 
style and focus on high versus low level features in manifold and applied contexts. Project 1 
highlights that individuals show an attenuated or even reversed negativity bias in judgments 
of truth under conditions of psychological distance, presumably due to a differential weighing 
of positive (superordinate) and negative (subordinate) information. Research on the 
differential consideration of desirability and feasibility concerns analyzes individuals’ 
preference for diversity when construing on a high level compared to a preference for 
similarity when construing on a low level. Project 2 investigates the stronger impact of 
Machiavellian values on behavior under high compared to low construal level. In project 3 we 
investigated how a small environmental cue can serve as a decision-making aid, resulting in 
stronger feelings and more affective judgments and decisions. By flipping a coin, decisions 
can be catalyzed and individuals are eventually able to make a decision where they had 
difficulties coming to a conclusion before.  
Depending on individuals’ construal level (or processing style), the presented research 
supports the general notion of Construal Level Theory that individuals attend to different 
pieces of information, resulting in different judgments and decisions. In the last section of this 
dissertation the importance as well as adaptiveness of changes in processing styles are briefly 
summarized, and implications for research and practice discussed. 
 
Chapter 4: Discussion and Implications for Research on Construal Level 
The previously described projects of this dissertation show that different processing 
styles result in different affective, cognitive, and behavioral outcomes in the realm of 
judgments of truth, diversity preferences, and dishonest behavior. However, processing 
information at different levels of abstraction does not only lead to different outcomes, but is 
indeed considered a functional behavior (Brown, 1958; Burgoon, Henderson, & Markman, 
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2013). To maximize accuracy when making judgments and decisions regarding 
psychologically distant things, individuals are required to broaden their mental horizons by 
focusing on central characteristics (high level features); therefore, “as things become more 
psychologically distant, people think about them at progressively higher levels of abstraction” 
(Burgoon et al., 2013, p. 503).  
Going beyond the application of Construal Level Theory to different contexts, the 
project on changing current processing styles by flipping a coin also highlights that not only 
the processing style per se, but the change (or shift) of the processing style might be of utmost 
importance. Bless and Burger (2016) argue that the change aspect is often neglected in 
theoretical conclusions (p. 298). In experimental research a confound exists when 
manipulating a certain variable (e.g., processing style): effects can either derive from (a) the 
absolute level of the processing style (abstract versus concrete) or (b) the change within the 
processing style (from more abstract to more concrete versus vice versa; see Bless & Burger, 
2016). Investigating this distinction could highlight the importance of the change as a key 
variable that drives observed differences. By changing a variable, the associated salience and 
accessibility increases, meaning it draws on individuals’ attention (Bless & Burger, 2016). 
Project 3 can be seen as a first step with regards to the impact of changing construal levels. 
Flipping a coin may serve in exactly this manner: By changing individuals’ mindsets, they 
may more strongly focus on pieces of information that gain in weight due to the more 
concrete construal level. Maybe it is, in fact, this change in mindset (and not only the absolute 
level of abstract- or concreteness) that therefore impacts individuals’ behavior and catalyzes 
the decision-making process. One could therefore conclude that sometimes it might not be a 
specific mindset that is adaptive to cope with a certain decision – but instead the change 
within mindsets that allows individuals to come to a conclusion in cases where they were 
undecided before (see Bless & Burger, 2016).  
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Future research could continue to investigate the adaptive link between processing 
style and differences in affect, cognition, and behavior, to understand and predict behavior in 
numerous applied settings. Taking a next step, future research could also build upon the first 
findings from project 3 and deep-dive into the impact and potential adaptiveness of the 
change of individuals’ processing style on outcome variables.  
 
Chapter 5: Discussion and Practical Implications 
Individuals’ processing style influences the encoding and processing of information 
and therefore subsequent judgments and decisions. As discussed before, Construal Level 
Theory would argue that the capacity for mental abstraction is an adaptive mechanism 
(Ledgerwood, Trope, & Liberman, 2015), as it allows to extract general information that is 
relevant across a diverse array of contexts (Kalkstein, Hubbard, & Trope, 2017). 
As highlighted in the last section, we would argue the change within individuals’ 
mindsets might serve them well in different situations. Change increases the salience of the 
altered variables and individuals tend to focus more on these (Bless & Burger, 2016). 
Therefore, the focus on these altered variables, such as more salient feelings, may allow 
individuals to make decisions where they were undecided or “stuck” before (see project 3 on 
catalyzing decisions). Further research supports the idea of the benefits associated with 
changing individuals’ processing styles and motivating individuals to take a different look. 
While in project 3 we focus more on the change from a more abstract to a more concrete 
mindset by decreasing psychological distance, other research projects indicate that increasing 
psychological distance might be advantageous, too. Bruehlman-Senecal and Ayduk (2015) 
showed that temporal distancing might be a means to cope with emotional distress (see also 
Kross, Gard, Deldin, Clifton, & Ayduk, 2012; Penner et al., 2016). By deemphasizing the 
concrete, malleable, and situation-specific features and by heightening the awareness of the 
impermanence of the negative emotional events and reactions, individuals’ level of distress 
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can be reduced (Bruehlman-Senecal & Ayduk, 2015, p. 358; but see Watkins, 2011 for an 
overview on conditions on when abstraction may be adaptive versus maladptive for clinical 
populations).   
  We would therefore argue that individuals may benefit in their everyday lives from a 
change in their mindset. Changing from the abstract to the concrete (or vice versa) might 
allow individuals to take a different perspective on a decision problem and allow them to 
make decisions or to implement better coping behavior, where they might have been “stuck” 
before. Given further research, individuals could actively use this knowledge and distance 
themselves when an abstract mindset is beneficial (e.g., with the help of imaginative 
techniques), and reduce psychological distance when focusing on details and subordinate 
information is advantageous (e.g., by flipping a coin).  
 
Chapter 6: Conclusions 
 This dissertation highlights that depending on their mindset, individuals might be 
more or less likely to judge a negatively framed statement as true, prefer similarity over 
diversity, and behave more or less honest when having Machiavellian beliefs. Moreover, 
intraindividual changes in processing style by simply flipping a coin might allow individuals 
to make decisions where they had been undecided before. The research presented supports 
these notions and provides a further piece in the puzzle of how we make judgments and 
decisions in the complex environment of our everyday lives. Furthermore, it accentuates our 
ability to abstract and to change our processing style as a powerful, but also adaptive 
mechanism. This ability may help us cope with emotional distress and allows us to come to a 
conclusion when we are torn between options. So, if you feel “stuck”, go ahead and take a 
different look: It might critically influence what you see, what you think, how you feel, and in 
the end behave.  
Take a Different Look                    Page 32 
 
 
References 
Bar-Anan, Y., Liberman, N., Trope, Y., & Algom, D. (2007). Automatic processing of 
psychological distance: Evidence from a Stroop task. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 136, 610–622. doi:10.1037/0096-3445.136.4.610 
Bardi, A., & Schwartz, S. H. (2003). Values and behavior: Strength and structure of relations. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29, 1207–1220. 
doi:10.1177/0146167203254602 
Baumeister, R. F., Bratslavsky, E., Finkenauer, C., & Vohs, K. D. (2001). Bad is stronger than 
good. Review of General Psychology, 5, 323–370. doi:10.1037//1089-2680.5.4.323 
Bless, H., & Burger, A. M. (2016). A closer look at social psychologists’ silver bullet: 
Inevitable and evitable side effects of the experimental approach. Perspectives on 
Psychological Science, 11, 296–308. doi:10.1177/1745691615621278 
Boston Consulting Group. (2017). Website of the Boston Consulting Group. Retrieved 
December 5, 2017, from www.bcg.com 
Brown, R. (1958). How shall a thing be called? Psychological Review, 65, 14–21. 
doi:10.1037/h0041727 
Bruehlman-Senecal, E., & Ayduk, O. (2015). This too shall pass: Temporal distance and the 
regulation of emotional distress. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 108, 
356–375. doi:10.1037/a0038324 
Burgoon, E. M., Henderson, M. D., & Markman, A. B. (2013). There are many ways to see 
the forest for the trees: A tour guide for abstraction. Perspectives on Psychological 
Science, 8, 501–520. doi:10.1177/1745691613497964 
Christie, R., & Geis, F. L. (1970). Studies in Machiavellianism. New York: Academic Press. 
doi:10.1016/c2013-0-10497-7 
Take a Different Look                    Page 33 
 
 
Epstein, S., Pacini, R., Denes-Raj, V., & Heier, H. (1996). Individual differences in intuitive–
experiential and analytical–rational thinking styles. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 71, 390–405. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.71.2.390 
Eyal, T., Liberman, N., & Trope, Y. (2009). Psychological distance and consumer behavior: A 
construal level theory perspective. In M. Wänke (Ed.), Social psychology of consumer 
behavior (pp. 65–87). New York, NY: Psychology Press. 
Eyal, T., Liberman, N., Trope, Y., & Walther, E. (2004). The pros and cons of temporally near 
and distant action. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 86, 781–795. 
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.86.6.781 
Eyal, T., Sagristano, M. D., Trope, Y., Liberman, N., & Chaiken, S. (2009). When values 
matter: Expressing values in behavioral intentions for the near vs. distant future. Journal 
of Experimental Social Psychology, 45, 35–43. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2008.07.023 
Fiedler, K. (2000). On mere considering: The subjective experience of truth. In H. Bless & J. 
P. Forgas (Eds.), The message within: The role of subjective experience in social 
cognition and behavior (pp. 13–36). New York, NY: Psychology Press. 
Fiedler, K. (2007). Construal Level Theory as an integrative framework for behavioral 
decision making research and consumer psychology. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 
17, 101–106. doi:10.1016/S1057-7408(07)70015-3 
Fiedler, K., Jung, J., Wänke, M., Alexopoulos, T., & de Molière, L. (2015). Toward a deeper 
understanding of the ecological origins of distance construal. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 57, 78–86. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2014.11.002 
Förster, J., & Dannenberg, L. (2010). GLOMOsys: A systems account of global versus local 
processing. Psychological Inquiry, 21, 175–197. doi:10.1080/1047840X.2010.487849 
Förster, J., & Denzler, M. (2012). When any Worx looks typical to you: Global relative to 
Take a Different Look                    Page 34 
 
 
local processing increases prototypicality and liking. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 48, 416–419. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2011.08.012 
Freitas, A. L., Gollwitzer, P., & Trope, Y. (2004). The influence of abstract and concrete 
mindsets on anticipating and guiding others’ self-regulatory efforts. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 40, 739–752. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2004.04.003 
Friedman, R. S., & Förster, J. (2010). Implicit affective cues and attentional tuning: An 
integrative review. Psychological Bulletin, 136, 875–893. doi:10.1037/a0020495 
Fujita, K., & Carnevale, J. J. (2012). Transcending temptation through abstraction: The role of 
construal level in self-control. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 21, 248–
252. doi:10.1177/0963721412449169 
Fujita, K., Eyal, T., Chaiken, S., Trope, Y., & Liberman, N. (2008). Influencing attitudes 
toward near and distant objects. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44, 562–
572. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2007.10.005 
Fujita, K., & Han, H. A. (2009). Moving beyond deliberative control of impulses: The effect 
of construal levels on evaluative associations in self-control conflicts. Psychological 
Science, 20, 799–804. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02372.x 
Fujita, K., Trope, Y., Liberman, N., & Levin-Sagi, M. (2006). Construal levels and self-
control. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 90, 351–367. doi:10.1037/0022-
3514.90.3.351 
Gasper, K., & Clore, G. L. (2002). Attending to the big picture: Mood and global versus local 
processing of visual information. Psychological Science, 13, 34–40. doi:10.1111/1467-
9280.00406 
Greifeneder, R., Bless, H., & Fiedler, K. (2018). Social cognition: How individuals construct 
social reality (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Routledge. 
Take a Different Look                    Page 35 
 
 
Halamish, V., & Liberman, N. (2017). How much information to sample before making a 
decision? It’s a matter of psychological distance. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 71, 111–116. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2017.03.004 
Herzog, S. M., Hansen, J., & Wänke, M. (2007). Temporal distance and ease of retrieval. 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 43, 483–488. 
doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2006.05.008 
Hilbig, B. E. (2009). Sad, thus true: Negativity bias in judgments of truth. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 45, 983–986. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2009.04.012 
Hilbig, B. E. (2012). How framing statistical statements affects subjective veracity: Validation 
and application of a multinomial model for judgments of truth. Cognition, 125, 37–48. 
doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2012.06.009 
Hsee, C. K., & Rottenstreich, Y. (2004). Music, pandas, and muggers: On the affective 
psychology of value. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 133, 23–30. 
doi:10.1037/0096-3445.133.1.23 
Hsee, C. K., Rottenstreich, Y., & Xiao, Z. (2005). When is more better? On the relationship 
between magnitude and subjective value. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 
14, 234–237. doi:10.1111/j.0963-7214.2005.00371.x 
Isen, A. M., & Daubman, K. A. (1984). The influence of affect on categorization. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 47, 1206–1217. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.47.6.1206 
Jaffé, M. E., & Greifeneder, R. (2017). Negative is true here and now, but not so much there 
and then: On the impact of psychological distance on the negativity bias. Manuscript 
submitted for publication. 
Jaffé, M. E., Greifeneder, R., & Reinhard, M.-A. (2017). Manipulating the odds: The effect of 
machiavellianism and construal level on cheating behavior. Manuscript submitted for 
Take a Different Look                    Page 36 
 
 
publication. 
Jaffé, M. E., Reutner, L., & Greifeneder, R. (2017). Catalyzing decisions. Manuscript in 
revision for publication. 
Jaffé, M. E., Rudert, S. C., & Greifeneder, R. (2017). You should go for diversity, but I’d 
rather not: On the impact of psychological distance on preference for diversity. 
Manuscript in preparation. 
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. New York: Farrar, Stras and Giroux. 
Kalkstein, D., Hubbard, A., & Trope, Y. (2017). Expanisive and contractive learning 
experiences: Mental construal and living well. In J. Forgas & R. F. Baumeister (Eds.), 
The social psychology of the good life. New York, NY: Psychology Press. Manuscript in 
preparation. 
Keren, G., & Teigen, K. H. (2010). Decisions by coin toss: Inappropriate but fair. Judgment 
and Decision Making, 5, 83–101. 
Kross, E., Gard, D., Deldin, P., Clifton, J., & Ayduk, O. (2012). “Asking why” from a 
distance: Its cognitive and emotional consequences for people with major depressive 
disorder. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 121, 559–569. doi:10.1037/a0028808 
Ledgerwood, A., Trope, Y., & Liberman, N. (2015). Construal Level Theory and regulatory 
scope. Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences: An Interdisciplinary, 
Searchable, and Linkable Resource, 1–10. doi:10.1002/9781118900772.etrds0052 
Liberman, N., & Trope, Y. (1998). The role of feasibility and desirability considerations in 
near and distant future decisions: A test of temporal construal theory. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 75, 5–18. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.75.1.5 
Liberman, N., & Trope, Y. (2008). The psychology of transcending the here and now. Science, 
322, 1201–1205. doi:10.1126/science.1161958 
Take a Different Look                    Page 37 
 
 
Liviatan, I., Trope, Y., & Liberman, N. (2008). Interpersonal similarity as a social distance 
dimension: Implications for perception of others’ actions. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 44, 1256–1269. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2008.04.007 
Lu, J., Xie, X., & Xu, J. (2013). Desirability or feasibility: Self-other decision-making 
differences. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 39, 144–155. 
doi:10.1177/0146167212470146 
Maglio, S. J., Trope, Y., & Liberman, N. (2013). The common currency of psychological 
distance. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 22, 278–282. 
doi:10.1177/0963721413480172 
McElroy, T., & Seta, J. J. (2003). Framing effects: An analytic-holistic perspective. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 39, 610–617. doi:10.1016/S0022-1031(03)00036-2 
Mischel, W., Shoda, Y., & Rodriguez, M. L. (1989). Delay of gratification in children. 
Science, 244, 933–938. doi:10.1126/science.2658056 
Moshagen, M., & Hilbig, B. E. (2017). The statistical analysis of cheating paradigms. 
Behavior Research Methods, 49, 724–732. doi:10.3758/s13428-016-0729-x 
Nan, X. (2007). Social distance, framing, and judgment: A construal level perspective. Human 
Communication Research, 33, 489–514. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2958.2007.00309.x 
Navon, D. (1977). Forest before trees: The precedence of global features in visual perception. 
Cognitive Psychology, 9, 353–383. doi:10.1016/0010-0285(77)90012-3 
Penner, L. A., Guevarra, D. A., Harper, F. W. K., Taub, J., Phipps, S., Albrecht, T. L., & Kross, 
E. (2016). Self-distancing buffers high trait anxious pediatric cancer caregivers against 
short- and longer-term distress. Clinical Psychological Science, 4, 629–640. 
doi:10.1177/2167702615602864 
Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1984). The effects of involvement on responses to argument 
Take a Different Look                    Page 38 
 
 
quantity and quality: Central and peripheral routes to persuasion. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 46, 69–81. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.46.1.69 
Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1986). The elaboration likelihood model of persuasion. In L. 
Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in exprimental social psychology (Vol. 19, pp. 123–205). 
New York, NY: Academic Press. doi:10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60214-2 
Rateau, P., Moliner, P., Guimelli, C., & Abric, J.-C. (2011). Social Representation Theory. In 
P. A. M. Van Lange, A. W. Kruglanski, & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), Handbook of theories of 
social psychology (pp. 477–497). London, UK: Sage Publications. 
doi:10.4135/9781446249222.n50 
Rixom, J., & Mishra, H. (2014). Ethical ends: Effect of abstract mindsets in ethical decisions 
for the greater social good. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 
124, 110–121. doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2014.02.001 
Rosenbaum, S. M., Billinger, S., & Stieglitz, N. (2014). Let’s be honest: A review of 
experimental evidence of honesty and truth-telling. Journal of Economic Psychology, 45, 
181–196. doi:10.1016/j.joep.2014.10.002 
Sagiv, L., & Schwartz, S. H. (2004). Values, intelligence and client behavior in career 
counseling: A field study. European Journal of Psychology of Education, 19, 237–254. 
doi:10.1007/BF03173222 
Schwartz, S. H. (1992). Universals in the content and structure of values: Theoretical 
advances and empirical tests in 20 countries. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in 
exprimental social psychology (Vol. 25, pp. 1–65). New York, NY: Academic Press. 
doi:10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60281-6 
Schwarz, N., & Bless, H. (1991). Happy and mindless, but sad and smart? The impact of 
affective states on analytic reasoning. In J. P. Forgas (Ed.), Emotion and Social 
Take a Different Look                    Page 39 
 
 
Judgments (pp. 55–71). Elmsford, NY: Pergamon Press. 
Semin, G. R., & Fiedler, K. (1988). The cognitive functions of linguistic categories in 
describing persons: Social cognition and language. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 54, 558–568. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.54.4.558 
Society for Human Resource Management. (2009). Global Diversity and Inclusion: 
Perceptions, Practices and Attitudes. Global diversity and inclusion: Perceptions, 
practices and attitudes. Retrieved from 
http://graphics.eiu.com/upload/eb/DiversityandInclusion.pdf 
Tesser, A. (1978). Self-generated attitude Change. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in 
exprimental social psychology (Vol. 11, pp. 289–338). New York, NY: Academic Press. 
doi:10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60010-6 
Trope, Y., & Liberman, N. (2000). Temporal construal and time-dependent changes in 
preference. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79, 876–889. 
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.79.6.876 
Trope, Y., & Liberman, N. (2003). Temporal construal. Psychological Review, 110, 403–421. 
doi:10.1037/0033-295X.110.3.403 
Trope, Y., & Liberman, N. (2010). Construal-level theory of psychological distance. 
Psychological Review, 117, 440–463. doi:10.1037/a0018963 
Watkins, E. (2011). Dysregulation in level of goal and action identification across 
psychological disorders. Clinical Psychology Review, 31, 260–278. 
doi:10.1016/j.cpr.2010.05.004 
Williams, L., Stein, R., & Galguera, L. (2014). The distinct affective consequences of 
psychological distance and construal level. Journal of Consumer Research, 40, 1123-
1138. doi:10.1086/674212 
Take a Different Look                    Page 40 
 
 
Appendices 
 
(1) Appendix A:   
Jaffé, M. E. & Greifeneder, R. (2017). Negative is true here and now, but not so much there 
and then: On the impact of psychological distance on the negativity bias. Manuscript 
submitted. 
 
(2) Appendix B: 
Jaffé, M. E., Greifeneder, R., & Reinhard, M.-A. (2017). Manipulating the odds: The effect 
of machiavellianism and construal level on cheating behavior. Manuscript submitted. 
 
(3) Appendix C: 
Jaffé, M. E., Reutner, L., & Greifeneder, R. (2017). Catalyzing decisions. Manuscript in 
revision. 
 
(4) Appendix D: 
Curriculum Vitae 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix A 
 
NEGATIVE	IS	TRUE	HERE	AND	NOW		
	 1	
 
 
 
 
Negative is True Here and Now, but not so much There and Then:  
On the Impact of Psychological Distance on the Negativity Bias 
Mariela E. Jaffé1 and Rainer Greifeneder1 
1 University of Basel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Author Note 
 
Mariela E. Jaffé and Rainer Greifeneder, Center for Social Psychology, University of 
Basel, Switzerland. 
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Mariela E. Jaffé, 
Center for Social Psychology, University of Basel, Switzerland. E-mail: 
mariela.jaffe@unibas.ch, phone: +41 61 207 06 14 
NEGATIVE	IS	TRUE	HERE	AND	NOW		
	 2	
Abstract 
How do people judge the veracity of a message? The negativity bias in judgments of truths 
describes the phenomenon that the same message is more likely to be deemed true when 
framed negatively compared to positively. The present manuscript investigates whether this 
negativity bias is stronger in the here-and-now, that is, in conditions of low psychological 
distance. This notion is informed by Construal Level Theory, which holds that negative 
information is more salient and weighted more strongly in conditions of psychological 
proximity compared to distance. Against this conceptual background we hypothesize that a 
negativity bias can be observed in conditions of proximity, but attenuates or even reverses 
under conditions of distance. Two studies provide support by manipulating psychological 
distance. A final registered study is suggested to put our preliminary conclusions to a critical 
test. Implications of these findings in a time of uncertainty, alternative facts, and post-truth 
politics are discussed. 
 
 
Keywords: negativity bias; judgments of truth; construal level; psychological distance 
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Introduction 
Truthfulness is one of the cornerstones of our society. Daily interactions and 
communications strongly depend on our belief that other people share truths, not lies. Grice 
(1975) maintained that when engaging in interpersonal interactions individuals are expected 
and expect from their counterpart that they follow the maxim of quality, which states that one 
should not say what one believes to be false and one should also not say something for which 
one lacks adequate evidence. At the same time, individuals are aware that not everything they 
are told is true, as perhaps best illustrated by the choice of “post-truth” as the word of the year 
2016 (Oxford Dictionary, 2016). Post-truth is an adjective described as “relating or denoting 
circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than 
appeals to emotion and personal beliefs” (Oxford Dictionary, 2016) and indicates that by 
sending emotional and belief-centered messages, communicators might try to bring across an 
eventually false message.  
Faced with the task of discerning truth from falsehood, individuals are known to rely 
on a number of cues (e.g., Dechêne, Stahl, Hansen, & Wanke, 2010). One of these cues is the 
message’s frame, which may, for instance, be positive or negative. Past research has reliably 
demonstrated that messages framed negatively (e.g., the likelihood for bad weather is 20%) 
compared to positively (e.g., the likelihood for good weather is 80%) are perceived as more 
likely to be true (e.g., Hilbig, 2009, 2012). Here we further investigate this so called 
negativity bias in truth judgments against the background of Construal Level Theory, which 
holds that negative information is more salient and weighted more heavily in conditions of 
psychological proximity compared to distance. We hypothesize that the negativity bias is 
stronger in the here-and-now, but not so much there-and-then. In what follows we elaborate 
these conjectures. 
The Negativity Bias in Judgments of Truth 
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A wealth of evidence suggests that negative instances tend to be more influential than 
comparably positive ones (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001), an effect that 
applies, for instance, to everyday events, major life events (e.g., trauma), close relationship 
outcomes, social network patterns, interpersonal interactions, or learning processes. The 
authors argue that the self is more motivated to avoid bad self-definitions than to pursue good 
ones, and therefore bad information is considered to be more salient and diagnostic, and is 
processed more thoroughly compared to good information (Baumeister et al., 2001). In one 
study by Kahneman and Tversky (1984), for instance, participants performed different tasks 
in which they either lost or gained the same amount of money. The authors noted that 
participants reported more distress about losing a certain amount of money than joy about 
winning the exact same amount of money, illustrating that negative instances have a stronger 
effect on participants’ mood than comparable positive ones. Similarly, prospect theory argues 
that the value function is steeper in the loss compared to the gain domain (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979). 
Consistent with this general bad-is-stronger-than-good tendency, Hilbig (2009) first 
reported that formally equivalent messages are deemed more true when framed negatively 
compared to positively. This bias is referred to as the negativity bias in truth judgments. In a 
typical experiment, participants are provided with a number of statements, which are framed 
either negatively (“85% of attempted instances of rape are successful”) or positively (“15% of 
attempted instances of rape are unsuccessful”). Participants are asked to judge the truth of the 
stated information. Results indicate that negatively framed statements are more likely to be 
evaluated as true than the content-wise identical, but positively framed statement (Hilbig, 
2009, 2012). Using a multinomial processing tree model, Hilbig (2012) suggested that the 
bias is not driven by differences in knowledge, but reflects a response bias. 
 But why should negative information be perceived as more true? Negative instances 
attract more attention (Pratto & John, 1991) and are perceived as more informative (Peeters & 
NEGATIVE	IS	TRUE	HERE	AND	NOW		
	 5	
Czapinski, 1990), perhaps because negative instances are more rare and more threatening 
(Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2003; Lewicka, Czapinski, & Peeters, 1992; Peeters & Czapinski, 
1990). As a result, negative (bad) information may be weighted more heavily than positive 
(good) information (Baumeister et al., 2001). Interestingly, this differential weighing of 
negative compared to positive information may be particularly prominent in the here-and-
now, but less pronounced in conditions of psychological distance, as suggested by Construal 
Level Theory, as we detail next.  
Construal Level Theory 
Construal Level Theory (CLT, Liberman & Trope, 2009; Trope & Liberman, 2003, 
2010) allows for novel predictions regarding the occurrence of the negativity bias in 
judgments of truth, as it makes predictions about how individuals process information, and 
more specifically about how different pieces of information are weighed. CLT starts from the 
assumption that individuals live in the here-and-now, but can psychologically traverse 
distance by thinking about the past or tomorrow, imagining being in different locations, or 
putting themselves in the shoes of others. The reference point for this mental travelling is the 
“me, here, and now” (Trope & Liberman, 2010, p. 457), and anything that is not on this zero-
distance point is said to be more or less psychologically distant. Hence, an event taking place 
tomorrow is more psychologically distant than an event taking place today; similarly, the 
issues pertaining to another country are more psychologically distant than issues pertaining to 
one’s own country or country of origin. Critically, CLT maintains that changes in 
psychological distance are closely associated with the level on which objects and events are 
mentally construed: As a general rule psychologically distant objects or entities are construed 
at a higher level and psychologically more proximal entities at a lower level. To illustrate, 
when thinking about a forest on a low level, individuals might picture individual trees, 
focusing on different kinds of trees or their colors, reflecting a very concrete representation of 
the concept forest. In contrast, when thinking about the same forest on a high level, 
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individuals may think about the totality of trees or the recreational and environmental 
opportunities a forest provides, reflecting an abstract representation.  
Of particular importance in the present context are CLT’s assumptions about the 
weighing of positive and negative information (Trope & Liberman, 2010). The theory holds 
that arguments in favor are superordinate to arguments against something, as the subjective 
importance of cons depends on whether or not pros are present more than the reverse (Eyal, 
Liberman, Trope, & Walther, 2004; Herzog, Hansen, & Wänke, 2007). Common examples 
are medical treatments: only if a medical treatment seems beneficial (has pros), one might 
consider and discuss the potential negative side effects (cons). If no benefits are apparent (no 
pros), potential side effects seem irrelevant instead. Because the conceptual hierarchy of 
information matters when construing on a high level (i.e., in abstract terms), but not when 
construing on a low level, CLT asserts that positive compared to negative information 
increases in relative weight with increasing psychological distance. Evidence in support of 
this reasoning shows that the mental salience of positive and societal outcomes of an action 
increases as social distance increases, and that framing persuasive messages in terms of gains 
compared to losses becomes more powerful when participants make judgments for socially 
distant versus proximal entities (Nan, 2007). 
Intriguingly, these differences in information weighing allow for the novel prediction 
that the relatively stronger weighing of negative compared to positive information in truth 
judgments as observed in the negativity bias should be particularly apparent in the here-and-
now (low level construal). With increasing psychological distance, however, the bias should 
attenuate (or maybe reverse), as positive information gains in weight.  
Summarizing the arguments above, Construal Level Theory suggests that there may be 
more to the story of the negativity bias in judgments of truth as has previously been told. In 
particular, when individuals construe on a higher compared to lower level, positive compared 
to negative information gains in weight. Therefore, we hypothesize that with increasing 
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psychological distance, the negativity bias should attenuate: the same information framed 
negatively compared to positively is likely perceived as more true in the here-and-now, but 
not so much in conditions of psychological distance. 
The present studies 
 To test the hypothesis that the negativity bias in judgments of truth attenuates with 
increased psychological distance, we conducted two studies, in which we asked individuals to 
judge the truthfulness of different statistical statements. These statements were framed 
positively or negatively and either concerned participants’ own country (psychologically 
proximal) or a foreign country (psychologically distant) to vary psychological distance 
(Liberman & Trope, 2008). A third and final registered study will be outlined that puts our 
preliminary conclusions to a critical test. 
Study 1a (Non-registered) 
 Study 1a builds upon the materials used by Hilbig (2009, 2012). We used 20 statistical 
statements that were either framed positively or negatively (to manipulate valance) and 
concerned conditions that were psychologically proximal versus distant for our participants 
(to manipulate construal level). As the dependent variable, participants judged the truthfulness 
of each statement. 
Methods 
Participants. The study was conducted online and was distributed via different 
German-speaking and psychology oriented groups on Facebook. The study took about eight 
minutes to complete. Based upon prior research using similar material (Hilbig, 2009), we 
assumed effect sizes to be medium to large. The a-priori power analysis with an α-error 
probability of .05 and a power of .85 indicated a required sample size of 52 participants (Faul, 
Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009). Fifty-eight individuals completed the questionnaire (10 
males, 48 females; Mage = 24.95 years, SDage = 4.93). Participants could take part in a lottery 
for three 10€ (approximately 10 US$) Amazon vouchers as compensation. 
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Design. Statements differed in regards to valence (between participants; random 
assignment) and psychological distance (within participants; random presentation). In 
addition to the two design factors, we counterbalanced across participants the positioning of 
the question labels on the horizontal axis (true left, false right vs. true right, false left). This 
counterbalancing was not analyzed. Data were analyzed as a 2 (valence: positive vs. negative; 
between) x 2 (psychological distance: proximal vs. distant; within) mixed design, with the 
statements’ perceived veracity as the dependent variable.  
Materials and Procedure. After giving informed consent, participants were provided 
with one exemplary item to familiarize them with the nature of the task. Participants were 
asked not to use any external sources (such as Google, etc.) and to provide their best guess if 
they did not know the answer. Following this introduction, participants were asked to judge 
the veracity of 20 items by rating them as false (coded as 0) or true (coded as 1). We used a 
set of slightly adjusted statements from Hilbig (2012), which were provided by the author via 
personal communication. All statements either focused on the participants’ country of 
residence (proximal; here: Germany) versus a far away country (distant; here, e.g., Vietnam, 
Peru, Ghana), and are provided in Appendix A. 
For exploratory reasons and following earlier research, we subsequently assessed the 
revised Life-Orientation-Test (Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994) in its German version 
(Glaesmer, Hoyer, Klotsche, & Herzberg, 2008), as dispositional optimism or pessimism may 
play a role in evaluating statistical facts (see Hilbig, 2009). Finally, participants were asked to 
provide demographic information, were asked for further comments about the study, and were 
thanked for their participation. 
Results 
Overall, participants judged 9.98 statements as true (about 50%; SD = 2.50), and 
individuals ranged from a minimum of 3 to a maximum of 15 statements judged as true. On 
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the individual statement level, the average ratings of truthfulness varied from .31 to .69. 
Proximal and distant statements were averaged to form two separate indices.   
To test our hypothesis, we calculated a mixed 2 x 2 ANOVA with valence as the 
between variable, distance as the within variable, and mean perceived veracity as the 
dependent variable. Results yielded a significant main effect for valence, F(1, 56) = 15.50, 
p < .001, η2 = .22, reflecting that statements framed negatively were more likely to be judged 
as true compared to the same statements framed positively, M = .56, SD = .12, M = .44, SD = 
.10.  Moreover, a significant main effect for distance was observed, F(1, 56) = 8.14, p = .006, 
η2 = .13, reflecting that psychologically proximal compared to distant statements were more 
likely to be judged as true, M = .54, SD = .16, M = .46, SD = .17, respectively. In contrast to 
our hypothesis, there was no support for the predicted interaction between valence and 
distance, F < 1. Including the average Life-Orientation-Test score as a covariate into the 
analysis did not change the results, except for the main effect of distance, which was no 
longer significant, F < 1.9. 
To further explore the lack of an interaction effect, we inspected the results on the 
individual item level (see Table 1). This inspection revealed that for four out of ten items in 
the condition of psychological proximity (statements related to Germany), no negativity bias 
occurred – meaning, that for 40% of the items, the premise of a negativity bias in the here-
and-now was not met. For exploratory purposes, we decided to exclude these four items 
(Items # 16, 18, 19, and 20) from the average veracity score. As the items in the proximal and 
distant conditions differed content wise (see Appendix A), this only affected the scores in the 
proximal-condition, while the score for the distant-condition remained unchanged.  
We then recalculated the mixed 2 x 2 ANOVA. While the main effect for valence 
remained significant, F(1, 56) = 33.91, p < .001, η2 = .38, the main effect for distance was no 
longer significant, F(1, 56) = 3.62, p = .062, η2 = .061. Most importantly, however, we now 
observed the predicted interaction between valence and distance, F(1, 56) = 8.60, p = .005, 
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η2 = .13, indicating that the strength of the negativity bias differed depending on 
psychological distance. Simple main effects indicate that in conditions of psychological 
proximity, negatively compared to positively framed items were more likely to be judged as 
true, F(1, 56) = 34.26, p < .001, η2 = .38. In conditions of psychological distance, negatively 
compared to positively framed items were also more likely to be judged as true, 
F(1, 56) = 5.62, p = .021, η2 = .09, but as expected (and as the significant interaction terms 
indicate), the effect size of the latter was much smaller than the effect size of the former.  
Table 1 
 
Veracity judgments (0 = false, 1 = true) for statements presented in Study 1a 
  Valence (Frame)   
  Negative Positive   
Distance Item # M SD M SD 
Mean 
Difference p 
Distant 
1 .59 .50 .66 .48 - .07 .596 
2 .69 .47 .55 .51 .14 .287 
3 .41 .50 .48 .51 -.07 .605 
4 .45 .51 .52 .51 -.07 .607 
5 .48 .51 .28 .46 .21 .108 
6 .48 .51 .14 .35 .35 .004 
7 .35 .48 .38 .49 -.03 .789 
8 .76 .44 .31 .47 .45 .000 
9 .45 .51 .31 .47 .14 .287 
10 .45 .51 .45 .51 .00 1.000 
Proximal 
11 .66 .48 .31 .47 .35 .008 
12 .62 .49 .17 .38 .45 .000 
13 .62 .49 .38 .49 .24 .068 
14 .76 .44 .62 .49 .14 .264 
15 .79 .41 .45 .51 .35 .006 
16 .59 .50 .69 .47 -.10 .421 
17 .55 .51 .31 .47 .24 .065 
18 .48 .51 .55 .51 -.07 .607 
19 .48 .51 .69 .47 -.21 .114 
20 .48 .51 .59 .50 -.10 .439 
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Discussion 
 Study 1a investigated whether the negativity bias attenuates with increased 
psychological distance, manipulated via spatial distance. Our primary analysis did not yield 
the predicted pattern of results. However, further inspection on the level of individual items 
revealed that the negativity bias did not show for four out of ten items in the here-and-now, 
which is surprising given the bias’ robustness in prior research (e.g., Hilbig, 2009). Because 
the existence of a negativity bias in the here-and-now constitutes the logical premise for the 
hypothesized attenuation in psychological distance, we exploratorily excluded these four 
items and reran our primary analysis, now yielding the predicted interaction effect. In 
particular, for statements concerning participants’ home country we found a strong negative 
bias, whereas this bias was still significant but much less pronounced for statements 
concerning a foreign country.  
Of course, these results need to be treated with caution, since we selected items based 
on the outcome (but in line with the ex-ante specified premise). Nevertheless, to increase faith 
in the observed evidence, it appeared critical to replicate Study 1a with the narrowed set of 
items. To this end, we conducted Study 1b using a set of five items that showed a negativity 
bias in the here-and-now, and five items that showed no bias in conditions of psychological 
distance (see Appendix A). While commendable because it may bolster the conclusions of 
Study 1a, this selection of items comes with a methodological caveat that we will discuss in 
Study 1b.  
Study 1b (Non-registered) 
Study 1a provided evidence for the hypothesized effect, but only if the set of items is 
restricted to those that show a negativity bias in the here-and-now (the premise). Because this 
selection was ex-post, it appeared critical to replicate the observed finding with a different 
sample of participants.  
Methods 
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Participants. The study was conducted as an online study advertised as a study on the 
evaluation of statements via psychology groups on Facebook and the email-pool of the online 
portal “www.forschung-erleben.de,” which communicates social psychological research to 
the German-speaking public. The study took about seven minutes to complete. Our a-priori 
power analysis with the assumption of a large effect size, an α-error probability of .05, and a 
power of .85 indicated a required sample size of 76 participants (Faul et al., 2009). Eighty-one 
individuals completed the questionnaire (19 males, 60 females, 2 no answer; Mage = 25.52 
years, SDage = 5.78). Participants could participate in a lottery for Amazon vouchers as 
compensation for their participation. 
Design. The design is identical to Study 1a, with the following exceptions: Valence is 
manipulated between participants, and each participant reads five statements only. Data are 
therefore analyzed as a 2 (valence: positive vs. negative; between) x 2 (psychological 
distance: proximal vs. distant; between) design, with the averaged statements’ perceived 
veracity as the dependent variable. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four 
conditions. 
Materials and Procedure. Materials and procedures were identical to Study 1a, 
except for the reduced set of times as detailed above (see Appendix A).  
Results 
Overall, participants judged 2.36 statements as true (about 47%; SD = 1.04), and 
individuals ranged from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 5 statements judged as true. On the 
individual statement level, the average ratings of truthfulness varied from .33 to .67. No 
statements were judged as true or false by all participants. For the subsequent analysis, we 
calculated a mean perceived veracity score over all five statements.   
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Table 2 
Veracity judgments (0 = false, 1 = true) for statements presented in Study 1b 
  Valence (Frame)   
  Negative Positive   
Distance Item # M SD M SD 
Mean 
Difference p  
Distant 
1 .62 .50 .33 .49 .29 .079 
3 .14 .36 .78 .43 -.64 .000 
4 .48 .51 .56 .51 -.08 .632 
7 .52 .51 .39 .50 .14 .413 
10 .47 .51 .78 .43 -.30 .056 
Proximal 
11 .57 .51 .10 .30 .48 .001 
12 .62 .50 .24 .44 .38 .012 
13 .38 .50 .43 .51 -.05 .760 
14 .71 .46 .62 .50 .10 .524 
15 .48 .51 .29 .46 .19 .213 
 
To investigate whether the negativity bias occurs in conditions of psychological 
proximity, but attenuates or reverses in conditions of psychological distance, we calculated an 
ANOVA with valence and distance as independent variables and mean perceived veracity as 
the dependent variable. Our results yield no significant main effects, all Fs < 2.33, ps > .131. 
But the hypothesized interaction between valence and distance was significant, F(1, 77) = 
16.12, p < .001, η2 = .17. Looking at simple main effects, results indicate that individuals in 
the proximal condition judged negatively framed items to be more true compared to positively 
framed items, M = .55, SD = .22; M = .33, SD = .18; respectively, F(1, 77) = 14.10, p < .001, 
η2 = .16, reflecting the expected negativity bias. In contrast, participants in the distant 
condition judged negatively framed items to be less true compared to positively framed items, 
M = .45, SD = .19; M = .57, SD = .16; respectively, F(1, 77) = 3.84, p = .054, η2 = .05. 
Including the average Life-Orientation-Test score as a covariate yielded a significant simple 
main effect between negative and positively framed statements in the condition of distance 
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(F(1, 76) = 4.31, p = .041, η2 = .05), but no changes in the overall pattern of results or the 
other significance levels reported before.  
Discussion 
 Study 1b sought to replicate Study 1a with a different sample of participants to attest 
to robustness of the effect. At least for the items employed, we can confidently state that a 
negativity bias is observed in conditions of low psychological distance, but no bias or even a 
reversal emerges when psychological distance increases. This is in line with CLT, which 
holds that positive information may become more influential compared to negative 
information in conditions of psychological distance. Note that both an attenuation (as in Study 
1a) and a reversal (as in Study 1b) are consistent with the theoretical tenet that the relative 
weighing of positive compared to negative information changes with increases in 
psychological distance. 
At least two important caveats need to be mentioned. First, Study 1a revealed that the 
negativity bias did not show for some items. This may reflect item specificities, in the sense 
that the bias works for some items but not for others. At the same time, it should be noted that 
the bias has proven robust in prior research (Hilbig, 2009, 2012). The second caveat is more 
fundamental: because we chose to manipulate psychological distance via different items for 
proximal versus distant countries, it is conceivable that the items differ systematically on 
dimensions other than psychological distance, and that these differences are responsible for 
the observed pattern of results. Study 2 is designed to address this concern. 
Proposed Study 2 (To be registered) 
Studies 1a and 1b provide preliminary evidence for a negativity bias in the conditions 
of psychological proximity, but an attenuation or reversal in conditions of psychological 
distance, consistent with the theoretical tenets of Construal Level Theory (Trope & Liberman, 
2010). One caveat inherent to both studies is that different items were selected to compute the 
proximal versus distal veracity index. Study 2 is designed to address this caveat and put the 
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hypothesized reasoning to a critical test by using the same items for a proximal versus distal 
experimental condition. In particular, in a first step, five items that showed a robust negativity 
bias in the condition of psychological proximity in Studies 1a and 1b are selected (Items 11, 
12, 13, 14, 15; see Appendix A). In a second step, within each item, Germany is replaced by 
Ireland. For German participants, items about Germany are psychologically more proximal 
than items about Ireland. We suggest Ireland because Germany and Ireland are socio-
economically similar in many respects, and the same statement content is equally plausible in 
both countries.  
Methods 
Participants. The study will be conducted as an online study advertised as a study on 
the evaluation of statements via the platform “Clickworker”. Our a-priori power analysis with 
the assumption of a medium-effect size, an-level of .05, and a power of .85, indicated a 
required sample size of 146 participants (Faul et al., 2009). As prescreening criteria we will 
require all participants to live in Germany. Participants will receive 0.75 € (approximately 
0.75 US$) as compensation. 
 Participants who do not give consent will be screened out from the survey. 
Additionally, eligible participants will be asked to indicate whether they see any reason as to 
why their data should not be used for statistical analyses at the end of the study. If there are a 
large number of participants who indicate that they do not want their data used for statistical 
analyses, we will recollect data to reach our target sample size. 
Design. Participants will read five statements that differ in regards to valence 
(negative versus positive valence). All items have repeatedly shown to produce a negative 
bias in conditions of psychological proximity. Again, participants’ origin (Germany) will be 
used to manipulate psychological distance, guided by the notion that for German participants, 
statements about Germany are psychologically more proximal than items about a different 
place (e.g., Ireland). In addition to the two design factors we counterbalance across 
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participants the positioning of the question labels on the horizontal axis (true left, false right 
vs. true right, false left). This counterbalancing is not analyzed. Our study therefore builds on 
a 2 (valence, random assignment) x 2 (distance, random assignment) between subject design. 
Perceived veracity over five items will serve as the dependent variable.  
Materials and Procedure. Materials and Procedure are the same as in the Studies 1a 
and 1b, except for the fact that the same content will be presented in statements in the 
proximal and distant condition and only the name of the country varies (Germany vs. Ireland, 
Items 11, 12, 13, 14, 15; see Appendix A). Different to Studies 1a and 1b, the revised Life-
Orientation-Test (Scheier et al., 1994) will not be assessed. We will assess demographic 
information (gender, age, and language proficiency) as well as how carefully participants 
completed the questionnaire (1 = not carefully at all – 9 = very carefully) and if they see any 
reason as to why we should not use their data. Finally, participants will be thanked for their 
participation. 
Anticipated Analyses and Results 
To investigate whether the negativity bias occurred in conditions of psychological 
proximity, but attenuated or reversed in conditions of psychological distance, we will 
calculate an ANOVA with valence and distance as independent variables and mean perceived 
veracity as the dependent variable, and anticipate a significant interaction between valence 
and distance. Simple main effects in the condition of proximity should indicate a strong 
negativity bias in conditions of proximity, but an attenuated or reversed bias in conditions of 
psychological distance.  
Discussion 
[to be actualized] 
General Discussion  
[to be actualized] 
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ppendices 
 A
ppendix A
. O
verview
 of item
s used in Study 1a and 1b (*). 
 
V
alence 
  
N
egatively fram
ed 
Positively fram
ed 
1* 
In A
fghanistan, 15%
 of all children die before their fifth birthday. 
In A
fghanistan, 85%
 of all children live beyond their fifth birthday. 
2 
40%
 of fatalities in the V
ietnam
 W
ar w
ere civilians. 
60%
 of fatalities in the V
ietnam
 W
ar w
ere soldiers. 
3* 
In Japan, 17%
 of children live below
 the poverty level. 
In Japan, 83%
 of children live above the poverty level. 
4* 
In Cam
eroon, 32%
 of the population cannot read. 
In Cam
eroon, 68%
 of the population can read. 
5 
In Bangladesh, 19%
 of all children at prim
ary school age do not attend school. 
In Bangladesh, 81%
 of all children at prim
ary school age attend school. 
6 
In G
hana, 18%
 of under-5-year-olds are nourished poorly. 
In G
hana, 82%
 of under-5-year-olds are adequately nourished. 
7* 
In Peru, 17%
 of the population does not have access to clean drinking w
ater. 
In Peru, 83%
 of the population has access to clean drinking w
ater. 
8 
In K
enya, 58%
 of pregnant w
om
en do not receive professional obstetrics. 
In K
enya, 42%
 of pregnant w
om
en receive professional obstetrics. 
9 
In the D
om
inican Republic, 31%
 of the population does not have access to 
im
m
unization m
easures. 
In the D
om
inican Republic, 69%
 of the population has access to im
m
unization 
m
easures. 
10* 
In V
ietnam
, 56%
 of the population has no access to clean sanitation. 
In V
ietnam
, 44%
 of the population has access to clean sanitation. 
11* 
In G
erm
any, 30%
 of all rape cases are never solved. 
In G
erm
any, 70%
 of all rape cases are solved. 
12* 
In G
erm
any, 20%
 of all m
arriages end in divorce w
ithin the first 10 years. 
In G
erm
any, 80%
 of all m
arriages last for m
ore than 10 years. 
13* 
In G
erm
any, 25%
 of the elderly suffer from
 several chronic diseases 
sim
ultaneously. 
In G
erm
any, 75%
 of the elderly do not suffer from
 several chronic diseases 
sim
ultaneously. 
14* 
23%
 of first-year students in G
erm
any give up their studies before they receive 
their final grade. 
77%
 of first-year students in G
erm
any finish their studies. 
15* 
In G
erm
any, 20%
 of under-25-year-olds have already used illegal drugs at least 
once. 
In G
erm
any, 80%
 of under-25-year-olds have never used illegal drugs. 
16 
In G
erm
any, 18%
 of under-17-year-olds sm
oke. 
In G
erm
any, 18%
 of under-17-year-olds do not sm
oke. 
17 
In G
erm
any, 70%
 of all eggs com
e from
 chickens in laying batteries. 
In G
erm
any, 30%
 of all eggs com
e from
 free range or barn chickens. 
18 
10%
 of all G
erm
ans suffer from
 a disability 
90%
 of all G
erm
ans do not suffer from
 a disability. 
19 
14%
 of G
erm
an adolescents have a very xenophobic attitude. 
86%
 of G
erm
an adolescents are open tow
ards foreigners. 
20 
In G
erm
any, 10%
 of all suicide attem
pts are fatal. 
In G
erm
any, 90%
 of all suicide attem
pts are not fatal. 
N
otes. Item
s 1-10 are psychologically distant (high construal), Item
s 11-20 are psychologically proxim
al (low
 construal) 
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Abstract	Individuals	strongly	differ	in	values	they	endorse,	and	these	values	might	impact	individuals’	(dis)honest	behavior.	This	project	focuses	on	interindividual	differences	in	Machiavellianism,	which	is	the	tendency	toward	cynicism	and	manipulativeness,	and	the	belief	that	the	end	justifies	the	means.	We	hypothesized	that	some	situations	are	more	conducive	than	others	for	Machiavellian	values	to	translate	into	behavior.	In	particular,	Construal	Level	Theory	holds	that	individuals	construe	social	situations	on	a	low-and-concrete	level,	or	a	high-and-abstract	level,	and	that	values	serve	as	high-level	behavioral	guides.	Against	this	background,	we	hypothesized	that	interindividual	differences	in	Machiavellianism	should	produce	differences	in	dishonest	monetary	behavior	when	situations	are	construed	abstractly.	Two	studies	tested	these	considerations	by	means	of	a	subtle,	indirect	measure	of	dishonesty.	Participants	were	asked	to	toss	a	coin	and	self-report	the	toss’	outcome.	With	this	measure,	an	above-chance	winning	probability	indicates	dishonesty	on	the	group	level.	In	one	condition	this	self-reported	outcome	was	linked	to	a	bonus	payment	for	the	individual.	The	self-focus	that	is	characteristic	for	Machiavellianism	was	here	predicted	to	translate	into	dishonest	(self-serving)	behavior.		In	a	second	condition,	the	bonus	was	linked	to	a	payment	for	a	charity.	In	this	condition,	the	strength	of	Machiavellian	values	may	be	unrelated	to	self-reported	bonus,	or	even	reversed.	Consistent	with	this	interaction	hypothesis,	in	both	studies	we	found	that	the	stronger	the	Machiavellian	personality,	the	higher	the	self-reported	probability	of	receiving	a	bonus	–	but	only	in	the	self-serving	condition	and	when	individuals	were	construing	abstractly.		Keywords:	Dishonesty;	Machiavellianism;	Construal	Level	Theory;	Personality	Traits	&	Processes;	Micro-Based	Behavioral	Economics	 	
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Manipulating	the	Odds:	The	Effect	of	Machiavellianism	and	Construal	Level	on	
Cheating	Behavior	
	
1	Introduction		 Dishonest,	deceitful,	and	fraudulent	behaviors	may	cause	severe	damage	on	the	individual,	group,	and	societal	level	(Mazar	&	Ariely,	2006;	Rosenbaum,	Billinger,	&	Stieglitz,	2014).	In	today’s	world,	there	is	no	shortage	of	political	and	economic	scandals,	and	many	of	these	are	characterized	by	persons	in	power	abusing	their	opportunities	to	benefit	themselves	or	a	selective	group.	A	prominent	example	is	the	recent	“Dieselgate”	affair	(Matthews	&	Gandel,	2015),	where	Volkswagen	is	accused	of	having	intentionally	programmed	diesel	engines	to	activate	emission	controls	only	during	laboratory	testing	(the	diesel	engines	therefore	appear	“cleaner”	than	they	actually	are),	which	caused	severe	financial	harm	to	customers	and	stakeholders,	and	negatively	affected	the	environment	in	an	unknown	dimension.	Dishonesty	was	also	a	major	concern	in	the	2016	US	election	and	in	the	BREXIT	campaign,	during	which	terms	such	as	“alternative	facts”	or	“post-truth”	emerged	and	thrived.	Given	that	honesty	is	one	of	the	cardinal	values	in	our	society,	this	picture	is	rather	puzzling.	On	one	hand,	one	may	conclude	that	behavior	is	no	longer	guided	by	values	such	as	honesty.	One	the	other	hand,	it	is	possible	that	values	are	still	guiding	behavior,	but	that	different,	more	egoistic	values	dominate	the	behavior	of	powerful	politicians	and	managers.	This	project	touches	on	both	perspectives	by	suggesting	that	values	may	guide	behavior	under	some	circumstances	more	than	others,	and	that	dishonest	behavior	surfaces	when	egoistic	values	and	beliefs	are	particularly	strong.	More	specifically,	we	suggest	that	a	high	level	of	Machiavellianism	may	result	in	dishonest	behavior—especially	when	the	dishonest	behavior	is	self-serving	and	when	individuals	have	an	abstract	representation	of	the	
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situation,	which	is	particularly	likely	in	conditions	of	power	(Magee	&	Smith,	2013;	Smith	&	Trope,	2006).	To	delineate	this	hypothesis,	we	start	our	review	of	the	literature	by	focusing	on	values.		
1.1	Values	of	virtue	and	vice	that	guide	behavior	
	 Values	are	concepts	or	beliefs;	they	pertain	to	desirable	behaviors	and	transcend	specific	situations.	Values	guide	the	selection	or	evaluation	of	behaviors	(Schwartz,	1992,	p.	4),	and	predict	a	broad	range	of	meaningful	decisions	and	behaviors	(e.g.,	Bardi	&	Schwartz,	2003;	Sagiv	&	Schwartz,	2004).	One	key	model	regarding	values	was	established	by	Schwartz	(1992),	who	suggested	10	basic	human	values:	universalism,	self-direction,	stimulation,	hedonism,	achievement,	power,	security,	conformity,	tradition,	and	benevolence.	Per	definition,	all	values	pertain	to	desirable	end	states	(Schwartz,	1992),	but	this	seems	to	relate	to	the	desirability	for	both	the	individual	and	for	society.	These	values	could	therefore	be	considered	as	values	of	virtue.	For	example,	the	value	of	security	might	be	driven	by	the	motivational	goal	of	safety,	harmony,	and	stability	or	society,	of	relationships,	and	of	the	self	(Schwartz,	1992).	Security	values	therefore	might	result	in	the	pursuit	of	primarily	individual	interests	(e.g.,	by	staying	healthy),	but	also	collective	interests	(e.g.,	protecting	the	national	security).	This	picture	differs	quite	drastically	for	more	“negative”	and	“dark”	values	and	belief	systems,	which	reflect	more	egoistic	motives	individuals	might	pursue.	Individuals,	for	example,	could	score	high	on	the	personality	trait	Machiavellianism.	Machiavellianism	describes	a	belief	system,	with	the	tendency	toward	cynicism	and	manipulativeness,	and	the	belief	that	the	end	justifies	the	means	(Gunnthorsdottir,	McCabe,	&	Smith,	2002).	Next	to	narcissism	and	psychopathy,	Machiavellianism	is	considered	as	one	of	the	three	personality	traits	of	the	dark	triad	(Paulhus	&	Williams,	2002).	To	varying	degrees,	all	three	entail	a	socially	malevolent	character	with	behavior	tendencies	toward	self-promotion,	emotional	
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coldness,	duplicity,	and	aggressiveness	(Paulhus	&	Williams,	2002,	p.	57).	These	values	are	primarily	linked	to	the	pursuit	of	individual	and	not	collective	interests.	
1.2	The	power	of	the	situation:	When	do	values	guide	behavior?		 Looking	at	the	continuum	between	values	of	virtue	and	vice,	it	is	apparent	that	individuals	can	strongly	differ	in	the	values	and	belief	systems	they	endorse.	However,	depending	on	the	situation,	these	values	are	more	or	less	likely	to	impact	their	behavior.	As	an	example,	values	have	a	stronger	impact	when	individuals	actually	focus	on	their	standards	of	behavior.	A	classical	field	experiment	from	social	psychology	depicts	this	notion:	Beaman,	Klentz,	Diener,	and	Svanum	(1979)	placed	a	mirror	behind	a	bowl	of	Halloween	candy	and	asked	children	to	take	one	piece	only.	Interestingly,	the	presence	of	a	mirror	led	to	decreased	transgression	rates	in	those	children	who	mentioned	their	names	and	addresses	before,	meaning	they	were	less	likely	to	take	more	than	one	piece	of	candy.	The	authors	argue	that	the	mirror	increased	individuals’	self-awareness,	which	makes	a	person	more	likely	to	focus	on	the	standards	of	behavior.	This	method	did	not	only	work	for	children.	Diener	and	Wallbom	(1976)	have	shown	that	college	students	tend	to	cheat	less	on	an	intelligence	test	when	they	observe	their	reflection	in	a	mirror.		 Findings	such	as	these	attest	that	situational	cues	influence	whether	values	impact	behavior.	To	the	extent	that	values	are	related	to	virtues,	increasing	the	impact	of	values	on	behavior	appears	highly	laudable.	However,	if	values	are	related	to	vices,	this	strategy	could	also	backfire.	In	particular,	if	the	situational	cues	increase	the	salience	of	“dark”	personality	traits,	individuals	might	be	more	likely	to	manipulate	and	cheat.	
1.3	How	does	the	mindset	influence	the	impact	of	values	on	behavior?	Eyal,	Sagristano,	Trope,	Liberman,	and	Chaiken	(2009)	showed	that	values	exerted	a	greater	impact	on	how	individuals	plan	their	distant	future	than	their	near	future.	When	planning	the	distant	future,	values	and	behavioral	intentions	correlate	
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more	strongly,	while	this	relation	attenuates	when	individuals	plan	for	the	close	future	(Eyal	et	al.,	2009).	These	findings	are	corroborated	by	Rixom	and	Mishra	(2014),	who	showed	that		participants	in	an	abstract	mindset	compared	to	a	concrete	mindset	tend	to	behave	more	honestly	–	except	for	situations	in	which	dishonesty	serves	the	greater	good	of	another	party	and	therefore	other	values,	such	as	benevolence,	were	more	salient.	In	both	cases,	participants’	behavior	seemed	to	be	impacted	more	strongly	by	their	values	when	they	were	primed	to	be	in	an	abstract	compared	to	concrete	mindset.	Findings	such	as	these	can	be	explained	by	Construal	Level	Theory	(Liberman	&	Trope,	2008;	Trope	&	Liberman,	2003,	2010),	which	holds	that	individuals	may	construe	social	situations	on	a	high-and-abstract	level,	or	a	more	low-and-concrete	level.	Abstract	representations	contain	the	gist	of	situations,	meaning	superordinate	and	central	information,	as	well	as	information	on	the	desirability	of	the	situations.	Concrete	representations	contain	more	and	more	details	and	subordinate	information,	as	well	as	more	information	regarding	the	feasibility	of	actions	in	situations.	The	level	of	construal	again	depends	on	psychological	distance.	Subjectively	distant	objects	or	events	are	construed	more	abstractly,	and	subjectively	close	objects	or	events	more	concretely.	In	regards	to	values	and	belief	systems,	Construal	Level	Theory	argues	that	these	concepts	generally	serve	as	high-level	behavioral	guides	(Trope	&	Liberman,	2010).	Values	are	abstract	and	decontextualized	by	nature	and	should	therefore	be	more	readily	applied	to	and	guide	intentions	for	psychologically	distant	situations	(p.	453).	
1.4	Dishonesty	as	a	result	of	an	abstract	mindset	and	Machiavellian	values	Against	this	background,	we	hypothesized	that	individuals’	values	impact	their	behavior	particularly	in	conditions	of	psychological	distance,	and	that	interindividual	differences	in	values	channel	whether	this	behavior	is	honest	or	dishonest	in	nature.	More	specifically,	if	values	such	as	fairness	prevail,	individuals	should	be	more	likely	to	
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show	honest	behavior,	particularly	when	construing	abstractly.	But	this	turns	when	dark	traits	prevail:	then	higher	levels	in	Machiavellianism	should	be	more	likely	to	produce	dishonest	behavior.	We	tested	this	idea	in	two	studies.	The	first	one	took	an	exploratory	approach.	Here	we	assessed	a	variety	of	personality	constructs	to	measure	negatively	connoted	values.	We	then	analyzed	whether	these	values	explain	dishonest	behavior	more	in	conditions	of	abstract	compared	to	concrete	construal.	The	second	study	was	of	a	confirmatory	nature.	Here,	we	focused	on	Machiavellianism	and	replicated	the	finding	that	individual	differences	in	Machiavellianism	explain	honest	versus	dishonest	behavior	under	abstract	but	not	under	concrete	construal	level.	
2	Study	1	Study	1	tested	the	notion	that	negatively	connoted	values	impact	behavior	particularly	in	conditions	of	abstract	construal	in	an	exploratory	way.	To	this	end,	we	assessed	individuals’	Machiavellianism	trait	scores	as	well	as	several	other	values	and	beliefs,	which	have	proven	to	predict	a	multitude	of	different	behaviors.		We	included	the	10	basic	human	values	(Schwartz,	1992),	given	their	predominance	in	the	research	field.	Moreover,	we	included	individuals’	belief	in	a	just	world,	which	refers	to	the	need	of	individuals	to	believe	that	their	environment	is	a	just	and	orderly	place	where	people	usually	get	what	they	deserve	(Lerner	&	Miller,	1978).	This	belief	is	associated	with	reciprocal	behavior,	and	we	assumed	that	it	could	be	related	to	honest	behavior,	because	strong	believers	in	a	just	world	might	fear	the	negative	fate	that	would	befall	someone	who	cheats	(Edlund,	Sagarin,	&	Johnson,	2007).	We	also	included	a	set	of	values	and	personality	traits	that	are	more	“dark”	and	potentially	linked	to	more	dishonest	behavior.	Machiavellianism	and	narcissism	are	both	associated	with	tendencies	towards	self-promotion	(Paulhus	&	Williams,	2002).	
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Whereas	Machiavellianism	is	described	as	the	belief	that	the	end	justifies	the	means	(Gunnthorsdottir	et	al.,	2002),	narcissism	is	associated	with	facets	such	as	entitlement	or	dominance	(Paulhus	&	Williams,	2002).	The	association	between	both	personality	traits	and	dishonest	behavior	have	been	investigated,	and	findings	indicate	that	Machiavellianism	could	indeed	be	linked	to	the	propensity	to	lie	in	different	contexts	(Baughman,	Jonason,	Lyons,	&	Vernon,	2014).		We	also	assessed	individuals’	belief	in	a	competitive-jungle	world	(Duckitt,	Wagner,	du	Plessis,	&	Birum,	2002),	which	was	defined	as	the	belief	that	“the	social	world	is	a	competitive	jungle	characterized	by	a	ruthless,	amoral	struggle	for	resources	and	power	in	which	might	is	right	and	winning	is	everything”	(p.	78).	Some	of	the	items	clearly	indicate	that	dishonesty	might	be	an	appropriate	behavior	(such	as	“You	know	that	most	people	are	out	to	“screw”	you,	so	you	have	to	get	them	first	when	you	get	the	chance”),	although	this	scale	is	more	related	to	the	study	of	prejudice,	ethnocentrism,	and	intergroup	hostility	(Duckitt	et	al.,	2002).		Last	but	not	least,	we	also	included	the	personality	trait	extraversion	as	a	control	variable,	which	to	our	knowledge	is	not	associated	with	dishonest	behavior	(e.g.,	Giluk	&	Postlethwaite,	2015).	To	test	our	hypothesis	on	whether	and	when	these	values	would	predict	dishonest	behavior,	we	relied	upon	a	setting	in	which	dishonest	behavior	would	increase	the	likelihood	of	gaining	a	bonus	payment,	either	for	the	individual	or	for	a	charitable	organization.	
2.1	Method	
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2.1.1	Participants	and	Design.	One	hundred	and	sixty	male	US-American	participants	were	recruited	for	a	“Personality	study”	via	prolific	academic1.	One	hundred	seventy-three	participants	started	the	study,	but	only	164	(Mage	=	32.29	years,	SD	=	11.24)	completed	it	by	reporting	an	outcome	regarding	the	coin	toss,	which	served	as	our	main	dependent	variable,	and	were	therefore	included	in	the	analyses.	Because	men	compared	to	women	have	been	reported	to	show	higher	scores	on	dark	triad	values	(Jonason,	Li,	Webster,	&	Schmitt,	2009),	we	recruited	male	participants	only.	Participants	received	£1.25	(approximately	US$1.5)	as	compensation	and	could	gain	another	£0.5	as	a	bonus	for	themselves	or	charity.	The	study	used	a	mixed	design	with	two	independent	variables	that	were	orthogonally	manipulated	between	participants:	Construal	Level	(abstract	vs.	concrete)	and	the	recipient	(participants	vs.	a	charitable	organization)	of	a	small	monetary	bonus,	which	could	be	won	at	the	end	of	the	experiment.	Participants	were	randomly	assigned	to	conditions.	Furthermore	we	assessed	individuals’	traits	and	values	(see	Materials).	As	the	dependent	variable	we	assessed	the	likelihood	of	participants	winning	a	bonus	payment	of	£0.5	(see	Materials	for	the	exact	setup).	
2.1.2	Materials	and	Procedure.		
2.1.2.1	Assessment	of	participants’	values:	Participants	first	completed	several	personality	and	value	scales,	such	as	the	Twenty	Item	Values	Inventory	(Sandy,	Gosling,	Schwartz,	&	Koelkebeck,	2017),	the	Competitive	Jungle	Social	World	View	Scale	(Duckitt	et	al.,	2002),	the	Narcissistic	Personality	Inventory	(Raskin	&	Hall,	1981),	MACH-IV	scale	to	assess	Machiavellianism	(Christie	&	Geis,	1970),	the	Multidimensional	Belief	in	a	Just	
																																																								1	Research	within	the	area	of	Construal	Level	Theory	indicates	the	occurrence	of	medium	to	large	effect	sizes	(classification	according	to	Cohen,	1992).	To	achieve	a	power	of	.80	with	an	alpha-level	of	.05,	we	planned	to	assess	40	participants	for	the	between	subject	cells	(construal	level	and	bonus	recipient),	resulting	in	a	total	of	160	participants.		
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World	scale	(Lipkus,	1991),	as	well	as	a	scale	to	asses	Extraversion	(John	&	Srivastava,	1999).	
2.1.2.2	Manipulation	of	Construal	Level.	Next,	participants	completed	a	construal	level	manipulation.	Participants	were	randomly	assigned	to	a	concrete	or	abstract	mindset	condition	and	construal	level	was	manipulated	by	asking	participants	to	either	think	about	why	(abstract	level)	or	how	(concrete	level)	they	would	try	to	reach	an	objective	(Freitas,	Gollwitzer,	&	Trope,	2004).	
2.1.2.3	Assessment	of	cheating	behavior.	Subsequently,	participants	were	introduced	to	a	coin	toss,	with	which	we	assessed	cheating	behavior	on	a	group	level.	As	cheating	is	not	a	socially	desirable	behavior,	we	decided	to	use	a	more	anonymous	and	subtle	paradigm	to	detect	this	behavior.	This	paradigm	was	developed	from	the	Randomized	Response	Technique	(Warner,	1965)	and	has	been	extensively	used	in	the	past	to	study	dishonesty	(Abeler,	Becker,	&	Falk,	2014;	Bryan,	Adams,	&	Monin,	2013;	Schindler	&	Pfattheicher,	2017).	In	this	paradigm,	participants	are	asked	to	toss	a	coin	to	determine	whether	or	not	they	would	win	a	bonus	payment	and	in	which	they	self-reported	the	outcome.	Winning	the	bonus	was	coded	as	1,	and	not	winning	the	bonus	was	coded	as	0.	By	this	means,	cheating	cannot	be	detected	on	the	individual	level,	as	it	is	impossible	for	the	researchers	to	know	whether	an	individual	actually	tossed	heads	or	tails.	However,	on	the	group	level,	a	significant	deviance	from	chance	(.5)	can	be	interpreted	as	indication	of	cheating	and	dishonesty	in	this	group.		Within	this	setup	we	varied	whether	the	bonus	could	be	won	for	either	the	participants	themselves	(self-serving	condition)	or	for	a	charitable	organization	(UNICEF;	other-serving	condition).	Moreover,	for	methodological	reasons,	we	counterbalanced	whether	the	bonus	was	won	for	tossing	heads	or	tossing	tails.		
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After	self-reporting	the	result	of	the	coin	toss,	participants	were	thanked	and	received	the	code	for	their	compensation.	
2.2	Results		 In	total,	118	out	of	164	participants	reported	winning	the	bonus	payment	(72%).	A	binomial	test	indicated	that	this	is	higher	than	expected	by	chance	(.50),	p	<	.001.	Theoretically,	with	a	fair	coin,	half	of	the	participants	should	have	won	the	bonus,	while	the	other	half	should	not	have	won	the	bonus,	so	that	a	significant	deviance	from	chance	level	is	an	indication	of	cheating	on	the	group	level.	We	analyzed	the	cheating	behavior	following	the	guidelines	of	Moshagen	and	Hilbig	(2017)	using	the	R	package	RRreg	(Heck	&	Moshagen,	2017).	Calculations	revealed	that	within	our	sample,	an	estimated	44%	of	participants	were	prepared	to	cheat.	Within	the	abstract	construal	level	condition	this	number	increased	to	53%,	whereas	in	the	concrete	condition	it	was	35%.	In	the	condition	where	participants	received	a	bonus,	this	number	increased	to	47%,	and	dropped	to	41%	when	the	recipient	of	the	bonus	was	a	charitable	organization.	The	logistic	regression	analysis	nevertheless	indicated	that	neither	the	effect	of	condition,	nor	recipient,	or	the	interaction	of	the	two	was	significant	(all	ps	>	.750).		In	a	next	step,	we	included	the	different	personality	and	value	measures	(mean-centered)	into	the	analysis	and	calculated	separate	logistic	regressions	with	construal	level,	bonus	recipient	(both	dummy	coded	with	0	=	abstract	construal	level	/	participants	as	bonus	receiver;	and	1	=	concrete	construal	level	/	charity	as	bonus	receiver)	and	the	respective	value	measures	on	the	likelihood	of	winning	the	bonus.	We	first	started	analyzing	the	impact	of	the	dark	triad	variables	Machiavellianism	and	narcissism.	In	accordance	with	previous	research,	we	found	that	Machiavellianism	significantly	predicts	cheating	behavior,	b	=	4.75,	SE	b	=	2.84,	Likelihood	Ratio	
Test	=	7.88,	p	=	.005.	This	effect	was	qualified	by	an	interaction	between	bonus	recipient	
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and	Machiavellianism,	b	=	-6.04,	SE	b	=	3.12,	Likelihood	Ratio	Test	=	7.33,	p	=	.007	and	by	the	predicted	three-way	interaction	between	bonus	recipient,	construal	level,	and	Machiavellianism,	b	=	6.39,	SE	b	=	3.84,	Likelihood	Ratio	Test	=	3.83,	p	=	.050.	To	disentangle	the	reported	three-way	interaction,	we	calculated	correlations	between	Machiavellianism	and	the	probability	of	winning	the	bonus	for	the	four	conditions	of	abstract	construal	level	*	participant	as	bonus	recipient	(r	=	.38,	t(40)	=	2.56,	p	=	.014),	concrete	construal	level	*	participant	as	bonus	recipient	(r	=	-.01,	t(35)	=	-0.04,	p	=	.966),	abstract	construal	level	*	charity	as	bonus	recipient	(r	=	-.17,	t(37)	=	-1.05,	p	=	.302),	concrete	construal	level	*	charity	as	bonus	recipient	(r	=	.03,	t(44)	=	0.21,	p	=	.834).	For	participants	as	bonus	recipients,	higher	values	on	Machiavellianism	led	to	an	increasing	probability	of	“winning”	the	bonus	–	but	more	so	under	abstract	and	less	under	concrete	construal	level.	For	charity	as	bonus	recipients,	the	interaction	is	opposite.	Under	abstract	construal	level,	higher	values	on	Machiavellianism	led	to	a	decreasing	probability	of	“winning”	the	bonus,	while	under	concrete	construal	level	the	relationship	appears	to	be	weaker.	Nevertheless	the	two	two-way	interactions	are	not	significant,	
ps	>	.108.	Figure	1	summarizes	the	findings.		(Figure	1)	
Figure	1.	Depiction	of	the	three-way	interaction	between	bonus	recipient,	construal	level	and	Machiavellianism	values	(mean	centered).			 Narcissism,	in	contrast,	was	not	a	significant	predictor	for	dishonest	behavior.	No	main	or	interaction	effects	reach	significance,	all	Likelihood	Ratio	Tests	<	0.86,	all	
ps	>	.354	(see	Table	1	for	the	exact	inferential	statistics	for	this	and	all	following	regression	analyses).	Going	beyond	the	dark	triad,	we	analyzed	the	impact	of	jungle	
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world	views	and,	turning	more	towards	the	values	of	virtue,	belief	in	a	just	world.	Both	belief	systems	did	not	significantly	predict	dishonest	behavior.	The	same	applies	for	the	10	basic	human	values	of	Schwartz.		 As	predicted,	extraversion	was	not	significantly	related	to	dishonest	behavior,	all	
Likelihood	Ratio	Tests	<	3.46,	all	ps	>	.062.	Table	1	summarizes	the	results	of	all	analyses	conducted2.		
																																																								2	Analyses	revealed	numeric	instabilities	when	estimating	the	full	model	for	Belief	in	A	Just	World,	Tradition,	Self	Direction,	Achievement,	and	Extraversion.	We	therefore	omitted	one	interaction	term	(construal	level	and	bonus	recipient)	that	is	neither	conceptually	important	nor	proved	to	be	empirically	relevant	in	the	present	study.		
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Table	1.		
Sum
m
ary	of	Study	1	regression	analyses	results.	
Value	/	Trait	
Predictor	
b	
SE	b	
Likelihood	Ratio	Test	
p	
Narcissistic	Personality	
Inventory	
Construal	Level	
-0.44	
0.98	
0.22	
.636	
Bonus	Recipient	
0.17	
0.80	
0.05	
.832	
Value	/	Trait	
2.10	
2.80	
0.58	
.445	
Construal	Level	x	Bonus	Recipient	
-0.59	
1.35	
-0.06	
1.00	
Construal	Level	x	Value	/	Trait	
-3.36	
6.18	
0.44	
.509	
Bonus	Recipient	x	Value	/	Trait	
-2.67	
3.85	
0.49	
.483	
Construal	Level	x	Bonus	Recipient	x	Value	/	Trait	
6.15	
7.54	
0.85	
.355	
Competitive	Jungle	Social	
World	View	
Construal	Level	
-0.58	
0.87	
0.48	
.488	
Bonus	Recipient	
0.12	
0.77	
0.02	
.881	
Value	/	Trait	
0.23	
0.34	
0.48	
.489	
Construal	Level	x	Bonus	Recipient	
-0.47	
1.22	
0.15	
.703	
Construal	Level	x	Value	/	Trait	
-0.51	
0.76	
0.47	
.494	
Bonus	Recipient	x	Value	/	Trait	
-0.57	
0.55	
1.14	
.287	
Construal	Level	x	Bonus	Recipient	x	Value	/	Trait	
0.68	
0.95	
0.52	
.471	
Multidimensional	Belief	
in	a	Just	World	
Construal	Level	
-0.61	
0.71	
0.72	
.397	
Bonus	Recipient	
0.07	
0.77	
0.01	
.925	
Value	/	Trait	
-6.37	
4.42	
5.78	
.016	
Construal	Level	x	Bonus	Recipient	
-	
-	
-	
-	
Construal	Level	x	Value	/	Trait	
6.61	
5.25	
5.80	
.016	
Bonus	Recipient	x	Value	/	Trait	
6.64	
4.56	
4.18	
.041	
Construal	Level	x	Bonus	Recipient	x	Value	/	Trait	
-5.44	
5.56	
0.83	
.364	
Conformity	
(10	basic	values)	
Construal	Level	
-2.15	
1.88	
2.32	
.128	
Bonus	Recipient	
0.27	
0.80	
0.12	
.733	
Value	/	Trait	
0.43	
0.50	
0.78	
.378	
Construal	Level	x	Bonus	Recipient	
0.04	
2.51	
0.00	
.988	
Construal	Level	x	Value	/	Trait	
2.49	
2.24	
1.90	
.168	
Bonus	Recipient	x	Value	/	Trait	
-1.20	
0.72	
3.11	
.078	
Construal	Level	x	Bonus	Recipient	x	Value	/	Trait	
-2.98	
2.63	
1.82	
.177	
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Value	/	Trait	
Predictor	
b	
SE	b	
Likelihood	Ratio	Test	
p	
Tradition	
(10	basic	values)	
Construal	Level	
-1.73	
2.02	
2.76	
.097	
Bonus	Recipient	
0.05	
0.78	
0.00	
.946	
Value	/	Trait	
0.49	
0.45	
1.38	
.240	
Construal	Level	x	Bonus	Recipient	
-	
-	
-	
-	
Construal	Level	x	Value	/	Trait	
0.97	
1.97	
0.29	
.590	
Bonus	Recipient	x	Value	/	Trait	
-0.73	
0.70	
1.11	
.291	
Construal	Level	x	Bonus	Recipient	x	Value	/	Trait	
0.38	
1.34	
0.08	
.776	
Benevolence	
(10	basic	values)	
Construal	Level	
-0.50	
0.87	
0.33	
.564	
Bonus	Recipient	
0.03	
0.79	
0.00	
.974	
Value	/	Trait	
0.72	
0.62	
1.64	
.201	
Construal	Level	x	Bonus	Recipient	
-0.53	
1.26	
0.18	
.673	
Construal	Level	x	Value	/	Trait	
-0.08	
0.86	
0.01	
.922	
Bonus	Recipient	x	Value	/	Trait	
-0.84	
0.85	
1.05	
.306	
Construal	Level	x	Bonus	Recipient	x	Value	/	Trait	
0.54	
1.27	
0.18	
.674	
Universalism	
(10	basic	values)	
Construal	Level	
2.35	
2.66	
1.02	
.312	
Bonus	Recipient	
2.70	
2.83	
1.12	
.289	
Value	/	Trait	
1.21	
092	
3.14	
.076	
Construal	Level	x	Bonus	Recipient	
-4.27	
3.56	
1.69	
.194	
Construal	Level	x	Value	/	Trait	
-1.28	
1.07	
2.08	
.149	
Bonus	Recipient	x	Value	/	Trait	
-1.20	
1.10	
1.58	
.209	
Construal	Level	x	Bonus	Recipient	x	Value	/	Trait	
1.68	
1.35	
1.83	
.176	
Self	Direction	
(10	basic	values)	
Construal	Level	
-1.52	
1.13	
3.71	
.054	
Bonus	Recipient	
-0.57	
0.80	
0.52	
.470	
Value	/	Trait	
1.42	
0.91	
3.20	
.074	
Construal	Level	x	Bonus	Recipient	
-	
-	
-	
-	
Construal	Level	x	Value	/	Trait	
-0.62	
1.35	
0.16	
.686	
Bonus	Recipient	x	Value	/	Trait	
-1.79	
1.11	
3.21	
.073	
Construal	Level	x	Bonus	Recipient	x	Value	/	Trait	
-1.44	
2.55	
0.42	
.517	
Stimulation	
(10	basic	values)	
Construal	Level	
-0.73	
1.04	
0.61	
.436	
Bonus	Recipient	
0.17	
0.79	
0.05	
.826	
Value	/	Trait	
0.08	
0.57	
0.02	
.889	
Construal	Level	x	Bonus	Recipient	
-0.50	
1.41	
0.12	
.732	
Construal	Level	x	Value	/	Trait	
0.40	
0.97	
0.19	
.663	
Bonus	Recipient	x	Value	/	Trait	
-0.64	
0.77	
0.72	
.396	
Construal	Level	x	Bonus	Recipient	x	Value	/	Trait	
-0.70	
1.27	
0.32	
.569	
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Value	/	Trait	
Predictor	
b	
SE	b	
Likelihood	Ratio	Test	
p	
Hedonism	
(10	basic	values)	
Construal	Level	
-0.48	
0.82	
0.36	
.550	
Bonus	Recipient	
0.07	
0.76	
0.01	
.925	
Value	/	Trait	
0.03	
0.43	
0.00	
.950	
Construal	Level	x	Bonus	Recipient	
-1.07	
1.51	
0.58	
.447	
Construal	Level	x	Value	/	Trait	
0.01	
0.73	
0.00	
.991	
Bonus	Recipient	x	Value	/	Trait	
-0.11	
0.67	
0.03	
.874	
Construal	Level	x	Bonus	Recipient	x	Value	/	Trait	
-1.40	
1.39	
1.17	
.279	
Achievement	
(10	basic	values)	
Construal	Level	
-1.26	
1.01	
2.27	
.132	
Bonus	Recipient	
0.08	
0.79	
0.01	
.920	
Value	/	Trait	
0.83	
0.65	
2.25	
.133	
Construal	Level	x	Bonus	Recipient	
-	
-	
-	
-	
Construal	Level	x	Value	/	Trait	
-2.65	
1.54	
4.03	
.045	
Bonus	Recipient	x	Value	/	Trait	
-0.37	
0.80	
0.22	
.638	
Construal	Level	x	Bonus	Recipient	x	Value	/	Trait	
1.09	
1.57	
0.51	
.473	
Power	(10	basic	values)	
Construal	Level	
-3.39	
4.35	
2.02	
.155	
Bonus	Recipient	
0.06	
0.76	
0.01	
.937	
Value	/	Trait	
-0.04	
0.48	
0.01	
.932	
Construal	Level	x	Bonus	Recipient	
2.00	
4.51	
0.33	
.566	
Construal	Level	x	Value	/	Trait	
2.73	
3.04	
1.86	
.173	
Bonus	Recipient	x	Value	/	Trait	
0.15	
0.61	
0.06	
.813	
Construal	Level	x	Bonus	Recipient	x	Value	/	Trait	
-3.73	
3.17	
3.30	
.069	
Security	
(10	basic	values)	
Construal	Level	
-0.55	
0.85	
0.42	
.519	
Bonus	Recipient	
0.23	
0.82	
0.08	
.782	
Value	/	Trait	
0.83	
0.65	
2.03	
.154	
Construal	Level	x	Bonus	Recipient	
-0.80	
1.30	
0.39	
.531	
Construal	Level	x	Value	/	Trait	
-1.22	
0.93	
1.89	
.169	
Bonus	Recipient	x	Value	/	Trait	
-1.74	
0.88	
4.77	
.029	
Construal	Level	x	Bonus	Recipient	x	Value	/	Trait	
1.87	
1.44	
1.31	
.252	
Extraversion	
Construal	Level	
-2.17	
2.12	
3.45	
.063	
Bonus	Recipient	
-0.32	
0.77	
0.17	
.678	
Value	/	Trait	
-0.23	
0.55	
0.18	
.672	
Construal	Level	x	Bonus	Recipient	
-	
-	
-	
-	
Construal	Level	x	Value	/	Trait	
-1.47	
1.89	
0.87	
.351	
Bonus	Recipient	x	Value	/	Trait	
0.15	
0.81	
0.03	
.858	
Construal	Level	x	Bonus	Recipient	x	Value	/	Trait	
4.68	
4.54	
2.94	
.086	
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2.3	Discussion		 Results	from	our	first	exploratory	study	suggest	that	higher	scores	of	Machiavellianism	lead	to	an	increasing	likelihood	of	winning	a	bonus.	In	line	with	our	theorizing,	this	relation	differs	depending	on	participants’	construal	level	and	the	recipient	of	the	bonus	payment.	Most	importantly,	when	participants	can	win	a	bonus	for	themselves	and	construe	the	task	under	abstract	construal,	a	significant	positive	correlation	between	Machiavellianism	scores	and	winning	probability	occurs,	attesting	to	increased	cheating	behavior.	But	this	correlation	drops	to	zero	under	concrete	construal.	The	relations	between	Machiavellianism,	construal	level,	bonus	recipient,	and	dishonest	behavior	are	especially	interesting	as	they	seem	to	be	unique	for	this	personality	trait.	Other	values	of	vice	such	as	jungle	world	view	or	personality	factors	that	should	not	influence	honest	or	dishonest	behavior	were	not	related	to	cheating,	and	this	correlation	was	not	influenced	by	either	construal	level	or	bonus	recipient.	Having	said	this,	the	exploratory	nature	of	Study	1	needs	to	be	acknowledged	and	addressed	in	Study	2.		
3	Study	2	Study	1	provides	first	support	that	when	individuals	construe	abstractly,	stronger	Machiavellian	tendencies	increase	the	probability	of	winning	a	bonus	in	self-serving	conditions,	but	to	a	lesser	extent	in	other-serving	conditions.	However,	this	first	study	was	exploratory	by	nature.	Study	2	was	therefore	conducted	to	replicate	these	findings	in	a	confirmatory	study,	focusing	on	Machiavellianism	and	the	self-serving	bonus	condition.		
3.1	Method	
3.1.1	Participants	and	Design.	Sample	size	was	determined	based	on	the	effect	size	of	Study	1,	a	power	of	.90,	and	an	alpha-level	of	.05,	resulting	in	242	participants.	
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Two	hundred	forty	two	male	US-American	participants	were	recruited	for	a	“Personality	study”	via	prolific	academic3.	Individuals	who	had	participated	in	Study	1	were	not	able	to	participate.	Two	hundred	forty	two	participants	(Mage	=	30.21	years,	SD	=	9.84)	completed	the	study	by	self-reporting	the	coin	toss’	outcome,	which	served	as	our	main	dependent	variable.	Participants	received	£0.66	(approximately	US$0.66)	as	compensation	and	could	gain	another	£0.5	as	a	bonus	for	themselves.	The	study	used	a	mixed	design	with	Construal	Level	(abstract	vs.	concrete,	dummy	coded	with	0	=	abstract	construal	and	1	=	concrete	construal)	as	an	independent	between	factor	with	random	assignment.	Individuals’	level	of	Machiavellianism	served	as	a	second	independent	variable.	The	likelihood	of	participants	winning	a	bonus	of	£0.5	for	themselves	was	the	dependent	variable.	
3.1.2	Materials	and	Procedure.	The	setup	was	similar	to	Study	1	with	the	following	changes.	First,	all	participants	could	win	the	bonus	payment	for	themselves.	Second,	participants	completed	the	MACH-IV	scales	only.	
3.2	Results		 In	total,	160	out	of	242	participants	reported	winning	the	bonus	payment	(66%).	A	binomial	test	indicates	that	this	proportion	of	wins	was	higher	than	expected	by	chance	(.50),	p	<	.001.	We	analyzed	the	cheating	behavior	by	again	following	the	guidelines	of	Moshagen	and	Hilbig	(2017)	using	the	R	package	RRreg	(Heck	&	Moshagen,	2017).	Calculations	revealed	that	within	our	sample,	an	estimated	32%	of	participants	were	prepared	to	cheat.	Within	the	abstract	construal	condition	this	number	decreased	to	only	19%,	while	in	the	concrete	construal	condition	it	was	44%.	The	logistic	regression	analysis	indicated	that	construal	level	was	a	significant	predictor																																																									3	Although	the	requirements	of	the	study	indicated	that	we	were	only	recruiting	male	participants,	two	participants	indicated	their	gender	as	female.	Because	it	is	unclear	whether	these	data	points	represent	true	answers	or	reflect	“misclicking,”	we	decided	to	retain	these	“female”	data	points	in	the	sample.			
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for	dishonesty	(b	=	1.22,	SE	b	=	0.66,	Likelihood	Ratio	Test	=	4.37,	p	=	.037).	Concrete	construal	participants	were	more	likely	to	act	dishonestly	than	participants	in	an	abstract	construal	condition.	When	including	Machiavellianism	(mean-centered)	as	a	predictor	into	the	model,	construal	level	remains	a	significant	predictor,	(b	=	1.55,	
SE	b	=	1.07,	Likelihood	Ratio	Test	=	4.58,	p	=	.032).	Machiavellianism	itself	significantly	predicted	dishonesty,	too	(b	=	3.63,	SE	b	=	2.27,	Likelihood	Ratio	Test	=	4.72,	p	=	.030).	Most	importantly,	the	predicted	two-way	interaction	between	the	two	predictors	was	significant,	b	=	-3.91,	SE	b	=	2.38,	Likelihood	Ratio	Test	=	4.58,	p	=	.032	(see	Figure	2).			(Figure	2)	
Figure	2.	Depiction	of	the	two-way	interaction	between	construal	level	and	Machiavellianism	values	(mean	centered).		To	disentangle	the	two-way	interaction,	we	calculated	correlations	between	Machiavellianism	and	the	probability	of	winning	the	bonus	for	the	two	construal	level	conditions.	In	the	abstract	condition,	higher	Machiavellianism	scores	were	associated	with	a	higher	probability	of	winning,	r	=	.17,	t(117)	=	1.86,	p	=	.066,	while	Machiavellianism	was	not	associated	with	a	higher	probability	of	winning	in	the	concrete	construal	condition,	r	=	-.04,	t(121)	=	-0.42,	p	=	.675.	The	significant	two-way	interaction	indicates	that	these	two	slopes	are	different	from	each	other.	
3.3	Discussion		 The	results	from	Study	2	replicate	the	findings	from	Study	1	in	a	confirmatory	setting	with	a	new	sample.	While	stronger	Machiavellianism	values	increased	the	likelihood	for	dishonest	behavior	under	abstract	construal	level,	there	was	no	such	relation	under	concrete	construal.	As	predicted	by	Construal	Level	Theory,	values	
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impacted	behavior	more	strongly	when	construing	on	a	more	abstract	level	–	and	we	show	that	this	also	applies	to	“dark”	and	negative	values.		Interestingly,	we	observed	that	cheating	was	more	pronounced	in	conditions	of	low	level	construal.	This	main	effect	of	construal	was	neither	predicted	nor	present	in	Study	1.	Since	we	used	the	same	set-up	as	in	Study	1,	and	recruited	participants	from	the	same	population,	it	appears	presently	prudent	not	to	speculate	about	this	main	effect.	
4	General	Discussion	In	this	manuscript	we	investigated	the	impact	of	Machiavellian	values	on	(dis)honest	behavior	using	a	coin	toss	paradigm.	Results	suggest	that	Machiavellianism	significantly	predicts	dishonest	behavior	with	higher	levels	of	Machiavellianism	being	associated	with	a	higher	probability	of	winning	a	monetary	payment.	Importantly,	this	relation	is	more	pronounced	in	situations	where	individuals	have	a	more	abstract	compared	to	concrete	mindset,	and	when	they	personally	benefit	from	the	dishonest	behavior.		These	results	provide	first	answers	to	the	puzzling	picture	of	rising	dishonesty	and	manipulativeness	in	our	society,	as	suggested	by	the	examples	of	the	Volkswagen	emission	scandal	and	the	spreading	of	alternative	facts	during	the	US	election	and	BREXIT	campaigns.	Our	project	taps	into	two	different	lines	of	explanations:	First,	behavior	might	still	be	guided	by	values,	but	situational	aspects	influence	individuals’	mindset	or	more	specifically	their	construal	level	and	can	strengthen	or	weaken	this	value-behavior	link.	Second,	as	values	are	still	guiding	behavior,	it	is	nevertheless	important	to	look	at	the	specific	values	that	might	influence	the	specific	behavior	in	a	given	situation.	It	is	crucial	to	determine	whether	the	specific	values	are	values	of	virtue	(such	as	honesty)	or	values	of	vice	(such	as	egoism,	or	more	specifically	in	regards	to	the	research	of	this	project:	Machiavellianism).	This	manuscript	provides	evidence	that	
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Machiavellianism	is	associated	with	dishonest	behavior,	and	that	stronger	levels	of	endorsement	relate	to	a	stronger	likelihood	of	showing	dishonest	behavior	–	especially	when	individuals	have	an	abstract	mindset.	Rising	levels	of	dishonesty	may	be	particularly	problematic	because	the	protagonists	of	political	and	economic	scandals	are	people	who	are	equipped	with	power.	The	implicit	societal	contract	with	individuals	seizing	power	is	that	this	power	comes	with	a	certain	level	of	responsibility.	Society	expects	both	managers	and	politicians	to	be	honest	and	fair,	and	actions	that	transgress	these	expectations	lead	to	reduced	trust.	An	article	by	Ezra	Dyer	from	Popular	Mechanics	(2015)	summarized	the	actions	of	Volkswagen	as	“outright	cynical	deceit”	and	Martin	Winterkorn,	the	then	CEO	of	VW,	personally	apologized	for	having	“broken	the	trust	of	our	customers	and	the	public”	(Rushe,	2015),	showing	that	more	than	pure	financial	harm	had	been	incurred.	One	could	now	cynically	speculate	that	people	with	the	urge	for	power	score	especially	high	on	values	of	vice	such	as	Machiavellianism	and	therefore	can	be	expected	to	cheat.	Alternatively,	one	might	speculate	that	conditions	of	power	increase	the	likelihood	of	Machiavellian	values	to	translate	into	behavior.	Previous	research	has	argued	that	power	increases	the	psychological	distance	one	feels	from	others	(Magee	&	Smith,	2013;	Smith	&	Trope,	2006),	and	this	psychological	distance	then	leads	to	more	abstract	information	processing	(Trope	&	Liberman,	2010).	As	values	impact	behavior	more	when	individuals	construe	in	an	abstract	compared	to	a	more	concrete	mindset,	it	is	likely	that	egoistic	values	translate	into	egoistic	behavior	for	powerful	individuals.		We	therefore	argue	that	there	is	no	easy	solution	to	tackle	the	rise	of	dishonesty.	Making	values	more	salient	appears	to	be	an	easy	fix,	and	different	studies	have	shown	that	increasing	self-awareness	might	indeed	increase	honest	behavior	(Beaman	et	al.,	1979;	Diener,	Fraser,	Beaman,	&	Kelem,	1976;	Diener	&	Wallbom,	1976).	Nevertheless	
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our	results	suggest	that	this	pathway	can	be	a	double-edged	sword.	Depending	on	the	nature	of	the	values	that	individuals	pursue,	strengthening	the	value-behavior	link	can	lead	to	both:	more	honest	but	also	more	dishonest	behavior.	This	warning	might	sound	gloomy,	but	it	also	serves	as	a	silver	lining:	In	situations	where	individuals	construe	abstractly,	for	example,	in	situations	where	they	hold	social	power	over	others,	values	have	a	stronger	impact	on	behavior.	In	this	project	we	focused	on	the	downside	of	this	effect,	showing	that	higher	levels	of	Machiavellianism	lead	to	more	dishonest	behavior.	At	the	same	time,	values	of	virtue	should	similarly	exert	a	stronger	impact	on	behavior	–	and	individuals	pursuing	values	such	as	honesty	should	be	more	likely	to	show	honest	behavior	and	less	manipulativeness.	In	support	of	this	reasoning,	we	find	that	low	levels	of	Machiavellianism	are	associated	with	lower	levels	of	dishonest	behavior.	Therefore,	societies	may	benefit	by	putting	those	in	positions	of	power	who	are	guided	more	by	virtue	than	by	vice.	
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CONTRIBUTION STATEMENT 
 
In this manuscript we investigate the notion of catalyzing decision by using a decision-
making aid such as a coin-toss or a die, a catalyst. These aids result in random outcomes, which 
individuals do not necessarily follow. Instead we assume that using a catalyst strengthens 
feelings (e.g., satisfaction/dissatisfaction, approval/disapproval). In line with previous work on 
the interplay between feelings and cognitions on subsequent processes, these strengthened 
feelings can then affect judgment and decision-making processes. Although the body of research 
on feelings and cognition is greatly impactful, this notion has not been investigated and 
integrated so far. We aim to tap into this gap with this manuscript. 
Our research builds upon previous findings such as the feeling-as-information paradigm 
(Schwarz 2012) or two-process models of value evaluations (Hsee and Rottenstreich 2004), and 
goes beyond by investigating the catalyzing phenomenon that seems to be commonly known 
among individuals. We provide four studies in different consumer settings, using different 
catalysts, and find support for our hypothesis that using a catalyst strengthens feelings and 
influences subsequent behavior. We discuss the theoretical implications of these findings for the 
literature on feelings as well as psychological distance, but also switch to the perspective of 
individuals and discuss the potential and limits of implementing this strategy in everyday life.     
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ABSTRACT 	
When individuals are undecided, they sometimes flip a coin or use other aids that produce 
random outcomes to support decision-making. Such aids lead to clear results, but interestingly 
individuals do not necessarily follow the aids’ suggestion. Instead when looking at the outcome, 
individuals appear to like or dislike it, and then decide according to this feeling. Here we argue 
that a decision aid renders a decision quasi-factual. As a result, feelings are strengthened and 
their impact on judgments and decisions is increased. We refer to this process as catalyzing 
decisions and to the aid as a catalyst. Study 1 provides evidence that using a catalyst leads to 
stronger feelings. Study 2 replicates this finding using a different catalyst, and rules out 
alternative explanations. Study 3 shows that a catalyst leads to more affective-driven decisions 
regarding donation behavior. Study 4 relies on the Iowa Gambling Task, in which reliance on 
feelings increases performance. Using a catalyst leads to preferring more advantageous decision 
options after collecting affective learning experiences.  
 
Keywords: social cognition, affect, feelings, preferences, decision-making 
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CATALYZING DECISIONS 	
Every day individuals are faced with many decisions. Some are clear-cut, but for others 
they are torn between options and remain undecided. To support decision-making, individuals 
sometimes use aids or procedures that produce random outcomes, such as a coin toss or rock-
paper-scissors. For instance, Francis Pettygrove and Asa Lovejoy once tossed a one-cent coin to 
decide on the name of a fledgling site, now called Portland, Oregon. In this case, the coin’s 
outcome determined the decision. Yet, interestingly, individuals don’t always end up following 
the coin’s suggestion. For instance, a friend of one of the authors once had to make a difficult 
career decision between two jobs after graduating from his law studies. He was indecisive 
between two offers. On the one hand was a very well paid position in a prestigious law firm, 
which would probably require high commitment and a lot of overtime. On the other hand was a 
position in a smaller company, which was not as well known and also paid less, but allowed for 
more flexibility in working hours. Both jobs had distinct advantages and disadvantages, making 
it difficult to come to a conclusion. The friend drafted lists of pros and cons, thoroughly 
considered the options, and talked to other people. In the end he tossed a coin. The coin 
suggested going for the well-paid job with long working hours – but suddenly the friend felt 
dissatisfied with the outcome and knew that he actually didn’t want to take that job, and decided 
to take the other job instead. He suddenly had a feeling regarding the options, and made his own 
decision based on this feeling. By using the coin, he was no longer undecided.   
This example of sudden feelings regarding the decision options as the result of a coin toss 
is not an isolated case. In a short survey that we conducted via Clickworker, all 31 participants 
were familiar with flipping a coin to make a decision, and 87% indicated that they themselves 
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already had applied that strategy. Participants were also familiar with other decision-making aids 
such as rolling a die or playing rock-paper-scissors. But what happens exactly when individuals 
use a random decision making aid, such as a coin flip, to finally make a difficult decision? Here 
we argue that when flipping a coin, a decision becomes quasi-factual, as if decided. As a result, 
feelings are strengthened and their impact on judgments is increased. We refer to this process as 
catalyzing decisions and to the aid as a catalyst. We borrow the term catalyst from natural 
science, as it is an additional component in the decision-making setting that initiates or 
accelerates the decision process. Providing initial support to this reasoning, 58% of participants 
in our short survey indicated that the coin toss elicited a feeling, such as tension or excitement 
(32%), but they also reported having felt happy or sad (21%) – depending on the outcome of the 
coin toss. Apparently, flipping a coin may be more than an aid that shoulders the burden of 
choice, but may strengthen feelings that help individuals to decide where they have previously 
been undecided.  
On the level of psychological processes, we argue that the catalyst renders the decision 
quasi-factual, that is, as if decided. Out of all possible outcomes, a choice has been made, which 
is not binding, but nevertheless can feel very real and has come closer. As a result, decision 
options may be imagined more vividly and with more details, and elicit stronger affective 
reactions. Consider evidence reported by Williams and Bargh (2008), who observed that 
closeness leads to stronger affective reactions when reading an embarrassing self-disclosure. 
Relatedly, Strack, Schwarz, and Gschneidinger (1985) reported that emotional reactions to past 
events are stronger when these are imagined on a more concrete (how they occurred) compared 
to an abstract level (why they occurred). Addressing the same notion in a very different context, 
Bandura (1999) pointed out that individuals distance themselves from atrocities or other actions 
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with very severe consequences by reducing vividness. Vividness is reduced, for instance, by 
using euphemisms (such as collateral damage to refer to civilians killed during bombing attacks) 
or dehumanizing measures (such as referring to prisoners by a number instead of their name). If 
disastrous acts become vivid despite this general tendency, emotional reactions are extremely 
strong. A particularly powerful real-world illustration of the impact of vividness was the airing 
on European TV of a picture of a dead refugee child who had been washed ashore close to 
Bodrum, Turkey in 2015. The picture shows the dead child, still wearing his clothes, lying 
facedown in the sand. This one incident elicited stronger affective responses than the month-
long, but more abstract media coverage of the refugee crisis. Media reports mirrored these strong 
reactions by asking what should change Europe’s attitude to refugees if not this picture 
(Independent 2015), while the New York Times (2015) argued that the distressing image could 
“act as a catalyst for the international community to finally halt war in Syria”. 
Stronger affect, in turn, is likely to be more salient and thus stands a higher chance of 
influencing judgment and decision-making (Albarracin and Kumkale 2003; Loewenstein and 
Lerner 2003; Raghubir and Menon 2005). Indeed, a plethora of findings suggests that feelings 
are used in decision-making, and may even constitute a critical ingredient (Bechara et al. 1997; 
Clore 1994; Clore, Gasper, and Garvin 2001; Gigerenzer 2007; Kahneman 2011; Schwarz 2012). 
From a philosophical perspective, it has been argued that feelings are the counterpart to 
rationality, a conflict between “divinity and animality” (Haidt 2001, 815). The classical view 
states that feelings are a disruptive factor in making decisions, but more recent works question 
this view (Loewenstein and Lerner 2003; Pham et al. 2001). Extant research suggests that 
reliance on feelings (next to thoughts) in judgments and decisions is not a phenomenon confined 
to very limited circumstances, but rather the automatic default operation of everyday life 
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(Schwarz and Clore 2007). The feeling-as-information account, for example, suggests that 
feelings, just like pieces of content information, can be used as information to make decisions 
(e.g., Pham 2008; Schwarz 1990). For instance, individuals might ask themselves how-do-I-feel-
about-it? (similar to the situation where one assesses one’s own satisfaction with the outcome of 
the coin toss) and then rely on this feeling to arrive at a decision (I feel so good about the 
decision object, I seem to like it, Pham 2008).   
In support of these conjectures, for instance, Hsee and Rottenstreich (2004) showed that 
providing more vivid information, such as pictures compared to text, leads to judgments that are 
more affect-driven. Also Greene et al. (2001) argue that judgments in moral dilemmas differ 
depending on the potential to engage individuals’ emotions. Dilemmas become more emotionally 
engaging, when being described as more “up close and personal” (S. 2106) and therefore 
individuals are slower to accept calculating decisions when human lives are at stake. Both 
empirical contributions thus illustrate that the experience of affect may result in stronger reliance 
on feelings in judgments and decisions. As further discussed later, this influence is ex ante 
neither good nor bad, and governed by highly flexible and adaptive processes (e.g. Huntsinger, 
Isbell, and Clore 2014). 
To summarize, aids that produce random outcomes may render the decision quasi-factual, 
that is, as if decided. As a result, feelings are strengthened and their impact on judgments is 
increased. In other words, a decision has been catalyzed, that is, psychologically initiated or 
accelerated. Against this background, we hypothesize that participants using a catalyst (catalyst-
participants) compared to participants without a catalyst (control-participants) report stronger 
affective reactions, and that these affective reactions may inform subsequent decisions and 
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preference judgments. Four studies that use different catalysts and different decision paradigms 
are reported in support.  
 
STUDY 1 	
 Study 1 investigates whether a catalyst may strengthen feelings, which individuals 
consciously experience and report. During the study, participants made five decisions and tossed 
a coin before each. Half of the participants were asked to ignore the outcome (control condition), 
and half were asked to think of the coin as a decision aid (catalyst condition). We hypothesized 
that feelings would be strengthened for catalyst-participants. Moreover, we hypothesized that 
catalyst- compared to control-participants report more disapproval and approval as well as more 
dissatisfaction and satisfaction with the coin’s outcome (depending on whether the coin toss 
resulted in pointing to an option that felt bad versus good). Complementing the picture, we 
further hypothesized that control compared to catalyst-participants would report more 
indifference regarding the coin’s outcome.  
 
Method  	
 Participants.  The study was conducted online, advertised as Visit to a restaurant: 
Choose your menu on the platform Clickworker, and took about eight to nine minutes to 
complete. Assuming a medium effect, and setting alpha to .05 and power to .80, we aimed to 
recruit 40 participants per cell (Faul et al. 2007). Seventy-eight individuals participated (38 
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males, 40 females; Mage = 35.76 years, SDage = 11.35). Participants received 0.75€ 
(approximately US$0.75) as compensation. 
 
Design. Throughout the study participants chose five courses of a restaurant meal. For 
each course they were asked to decide between two options. Before making the decision a coin 
was tossed. As a between factor we either asked participants to use the coin toss as a decision-
making aid that randomly suggests an option (catalyst-condition) or we labeled the coin toss as 
irrelevant and asked participants to ignore it completely (control-condition).  
 
Materials and procedure. Participants gave informed consent, and were first asked to 
indicate any specific dietary preferences (e.g., being a vegetarian or eating gluten-free). We used 
this information to tailor the menu options such that all participants could eat what they were 
offered as choices. Subsequently, participants were introduced to the coin toss, which was 
integrated into the study as an animated GIF-image of a spinning coin that stopped randomly at 
either heads or tails. Participants could give the coin toss as many tries as they wanted. This was 
done to increase their faith in a random process. In the catalyst-condition participants learned 
that heads meant the coin suggested the option on the left and tails meant the coin suggested the 
option on the right. In the control-condition, participants were asked not to let the coin distract 
them from making their decisions.  
All participants then proceeded to the decision about their first course. Two options were 
offered (e.g., tuna carpaccio with fresh horseradish versus quinoa-pesto salad with nut-bread), 
one on the left and one on the right side of the screen. The coin would then be tossed and either 
pointed to one option (therefore making a suggestion; catalyst-condition) or appeared in the 
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middle of the screen (therefore making no suggestion; control-condition). Subsequently, 
participants were asked to decide by clicking on one of the options. This procedure was repeated 
for all five courses of the menu.  
After choosing the fifth course, participants were asked how much attention they had paid 
to the outcome of the coin toss (heads or tails) (1 = not at all; 7 = very much) and how much they 
had been interested in the outcome of the coin toss (heads or tails) (1 = not at all; 7 = very 
much); these items served as manipulation checks. Participants were then asked to which extent 
they experienced a reaction of (a) indifference, (b) annoyance, (c) disapproval and/or approval to 
the outcome of the coin toss, (d) dissatisfaction and/or satisfaction as a reaction to the coin tosses 
(1 = not at all; 7 = very much). At the end, participants were asked if, immediately after the coin 
tosses, they had a feeling which option they would (not) prefer (1 = no feeling at all; 7 = very 
strong feeling). 
Finally, participants were asked to provide demographic information including gender 
and age, and about the carefulness of completing the questionnaire. Participants were thanked 
and received their compensation.    
 
Results 
 
 To compare answers of participants in the catalyst-condition and control-condition, we 
calculated t-tests for independent samples. When a significant Levene test indicated that 
variances were not equal, we report the corrected results.  
 
	 12	
Manipulation check. Catalyst-participants indicated having paid more attention to the 
outcomes of the coin toss compared to control-participants, Mcatalyst = 3.26, SDcatalyst = 1.96, and 
Mcontrol = 2.05, SDcontrol = 1.57, respectively, t(72.63) = 3.00, p = .004, r = 0.33. Catalyst-
participants were also more interested in the coin toss’ outcome compared to control-
participants, Mcatalyst = 2.51, SDcatalyst = 1.75, and Mcontrol = 1.79, SDcontrol = 1.36, respectively, 
t(71.73) = 2.03, p = .046, r = 0.23.  
 
 Feelings. In support of our hypotheses, catalyst- compared to control-participants felt 
more strongly which option they would prefer immediately after the coin tosses, Mcatalyst = 3.85, 
SDcatalyst = 2.17, and Mcontrol = 2.10, SDcontrol = 1.70, t(71.84) = 3.95, p < .001, r = 0.42. 
Moreover, catalyst- compared to control-participants reported stronger feelings of disapproval 
and/or approval (Mcatalyst = 4.08, SDcatalyst = 1.68, and Mcontrol = 1.92, SDcontrol = 1.38, t(76) = 6.19, 
p < .001, r = 0.58) as well as dissatisfaction and/or satisfaction (Mcatalyst = 3.49, SDcatalyst = 1.60, 
and Mcontrol = 2.51, SDcontrol = 1.55, t(76) = 2.73, p = .008, r = 0.30).  
In contrast, compared to catalyst-participants, control-participants indicated more 
indifference regarding the coin toss (Mcatalyst = 4.51, SDcatalyst = 1.81, and Mcontrol = 5.77, 
SDcontrol = 1.74), t(76) = -3.13, p = .002, r = 0.34. No statistically significant differences occurred 
regarding annoyance (Mcatalyst = 4.13, SDcatalyst = 1.64, and Mcontrol = 4.74, SDcontrol = 1.96), 
t(76) = -1.51, p = .136, r = 0.17.  
 
 Additional analyses. To rule out that catalyst-participants simply followed the coin’s 
suggestion when making their choices, we analyzed the occurrence of dependencies between the 
outcome of the coin toss and the choices made by calculating a χ2-Tests for each of the five menu 
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courses. None of these tests indicates dependencies (all χ2s < 1), except for course four, where a 
slight tendency for choosing the option the coin was not pointing to was observed, χ2(1) = 3.13, 
p = .067. 
 
Discussion 	
Study 1 provides first experimental evidence that flipping a coin may strengthen feelings. 
Specifically, catalyst- compared to control-participants reported stronger immediate feelings of 
which option they would (not) prefer. Furthermore, catalyst-participants reported stronger 
feelings of disapproval versus approval and dissatisfaction versus satisfaction concerning the 
outcome of the coin. Complementarily, control-participants were more indifferent to the 
outcomes of the coin tosses.  
   
STUDY 2 
 
Study 1 revealed that a decision aid that is used as a catalyst (compared to just being 
present yet ignored) strengthens feelings. At least two explanations that are different from the 
suggested process may be advanced. First, it could be argued that control-participants felt 
discouraged from reporting feelings, because reporting feelings might indicate that they did not 
properly follow instructions, that is, ignore the coin tosses, as participants were asked to report 
their feelings as reactions towards the coin toss. To formally address this account, study 2 was 
designed such that all participants should pay attention to the catalysts. This change also 
addresses a second alternative account, which holds that control- compared to catalyst-
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participants were distracted by the ignoring-task and therefore paid less attention to their 
feelings.  
Compared to study 1, two further changes were introduced: we additionally assessed 
feelings directly after each decision, and used a different catalyst.  
 
Method  	
 Participants.  The study was conducted as an online study and advertised as Visit to a 
restaurant: Choose your menu on the platform Clickworker and took about eight minutes to 
complete. Taking into account that study 1 revealed small to medium effects, and setting alpha to 
.05 and power to .80, we aimed to recruit 90 participants (Faul et al. 2007).  Eighty-seven 
individuals participated (47 males, 38 females, 2 no answer; Mage = 35.97 years, SDage = 12.39). 
Participants received 0.90€ (approximately US$0.90) as compensation. 
 
Design. As in study 1, participants hypothetically chose five meal courses in a restaurant. 
For each course they were asked to decide between two options and all participants were always 
provided with the decision aid. Importantly, we varied the number of times from zero to five that 
participants received a suggestion from the aid, producing zero to five catalyst- versus control 
trials. Number of suggestions (zero to five) was treated as between participants factor, and 
participants were randomly assigned to one of the six factor levels. 
 
Materials and procedure. The study used the same menu options as study 1. Participants 
received a link to the online study, gave informed consent, and learned from the instructions that 
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they would be choosing a five-course meal. Participants were then introduced to a die that served 
as a decision-making aid, which would be rolled before each decision. Crucially, if the die 
outcome was a one or two, it suggested choosing the left or the right option, respectively, thus 
serving as a catalyst (catalyst-trial). In contrast, if the die outcome was a three, four, five, or six, 
the die did not make a suggestion (control-trial). Participants could roll the die for testing as 
often as they wanted.  
Subsequently, participants proceeded to the decision about their first course. Two options 
were offered, one on the left and the other on the right side of the screen. The die would then be 
rolled above these options (see appendix A for screenshots) and either indicated a suggestion by 
appearing above one option (catalyst-trial) or in the middle of the screen below the two options 
(control-trial). Participants were then asked to make a decision by clicking on one of the options. 
After making their choices, participants were asked if the die had made a suggestion for one of 
the menu options (yes vs. no, as manipulation check). We also asked participants to indicate, 
which of the following options would best describe their reaction right after the die roll: 
satisfaction, dissatisfaction, indifference, or annoyance (forced-choice item). Finally, we asked if 
rolling the die elicited an immediate feeling of which option they would prefer or not prefer 
(1 = no feeling at all; 7 = very strong feeling). This procedure was repeated for all five courses.  
After choosing the final course, participants were prompted for several summary 
judgments. In particular, we asked how much they were interested in the outcomes of rolling the 
die (1 = not at all; 7 = very much) and if the die elicited an immediate feeling of which option 
they would prefer or not prefer, separately for catalyst-trials and control-trials (1 = no feeling at 
all; 7 = very strong feeling). We also asked participants if, while rolling the die, they had wished 
that it would be pointing to one option over the other (never to five times, coded 1 – 6 in the 
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analysis). At the end of the survey, participants were asked to provide demographic information 
including gender and age. Participants were thanked and received their payment.    
 
Results 
 
To check whether participants understood the set-up, we analyzed the manipulation check 
question if participants indicated that the die made a suggestion when it actually pointed to one 
option over the other. Out of 87 participants, 77 answered these questions correctly for all five 
trials, eight individuals made one mistake, one participant made two mistakes, and one made 
four mistakes. We checked whether excluding the participants changed the pattern of the results, 
which was not the case. We thus report the results for the entire sample. 
 
Strengthening Feelings. Looking at the question of whether rolling the die elicited an 
immediate feeling of which option participants would (not) prefer, we calculated a mixed model 
(see Judd, Westfall, and Kenny 2012) with type of trial as independent and strength of an 
immediate feeling of preference as dependent variable, with trial and participants as random 
factors. Participants reported having stronger immediate feelings in catalyst- compared to 
control-trials, Mcatalyst = 2.65, SDcatalyst = 1.82, and Mcontrol = 1.95, SDcontrol = 1.54, t(34.91) = 3.20, 
p = .003. 
 
 Frequency of feelings. To analyze whether emotional reactions towards the die outcomes 
differ depending on catalyst- versus control-trials, we collapsed the results of the five rounds and 
calculated χ2 Tests with type of trial as independent and the resulting feeling as dependent 
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variable. There was a significant association between condition and the reported feeling 
χ2 (3) = 30.17, p < .001. For catalyst trials, 23.3% of participants indicated a reaction best 
described as satisfaction, 9.6% as dissatisfaction, 57.1% as indifference, and 10% as annoyance. 
In contrast, in control-trials, only 6.5% of participants indicated reacting in a way best described 
as satisfaction, 6.9% as dissatisfaction, but 66.7% indicated indifference and 19.9% annoyance. 
In catalyst- compared to control-trials, participants were 3.6 times more likely to indicate 
satisfaction and 1.4 times more likely to report dissatisfaction as the predominant reaction. In 
control- compared to catalyst-trials, participants were 1.15 times more likely to indicate 
indifference and 1.96 times more likely to indicate annoyance as best describing the reaction 
elicited by the outcome of the die roll. Analyzing standardized residuals, we can further conclude 
that feelings of satisfaction were reported significantly more often in catalyst-trials, and 
significantly less often in control-trials, than would be expected by chance (z = 3.2 and z = -3.2, 
respectively; all other standardized residuals, zs < |1.91|).   
 
 Frequency of recommendations. To check whether the number of suggestions (zero to 
five) is associated with the frequency of the specified feelings, we calculated bivariate 
correlations. Interestingly, the number of recommendations correlated significantly positively 
with frequency of satisfaction, r(87) = .26, p = .016, and significantly negatively with frequency 
of annoyance, r(87) = -.26, p = .016, meaning that the more recommendations the die made, the 
more feelings of satisfactions and less feelings of annoyance were reported. The remaining 
correlations were not significant, rs < |-.13|. 
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 Summary evaluations after making all decisions. To compare the strength of immediate 
feelings of (not) preferring an option for catalyst- compared to control-trials (two separate 
questions), we calculated a paired samples t-test. For catalyst-trials, participants indicated 
stronger immediate feelings than for control-trials, Mcatalyst = 2.32, SDcatalyst = 1.74, and 
Mcontrol = 1.74, SDcontrol = 1.40, respectively, t(56) = 2.64, p = .011, r = 0.33. Furthermore, to 
check for alternative explanations we analyzed whether participants differed in their interest for 
the outcome of the die roll, depending on having received more or less suggestions. We 
calculated a linear regression to predict interest in the outcome of the die roll based on the 
number of suggestions, which was not significant, F(1, 86) = 1.38, p = .244.  
 
Discussion 
 
Study 2 was conducted to replicate the findings from study 1 with a different catalyst, a 
die, to gauge the results’ generalizability. Furthermore, study 2 was designed to rule out 
alternative explanations that questioned the suitability of the control group. This was achieved by 
providing the decision aid to all participants in all trials, yet varying whether the aid provides a 
suggestion and thus serves as a catalyst (catalyst-trials) or not (control-trials). 
Results of study 2 corroborate the hypotheses, as participants reported stronger feelings 
in catalyst- compared to control-trials. Moreover, feelings of satisfaction were reported 
significantly more often in catalyst-trials, and significantly less often in control-trials, than would 
be expected by chance. Furthermore, the more suggestions participants received the more 
feelings of satisfaction and less feelings of annoyance were reported.  
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Interestingly, feelings of dissatisfaction did not significantly vary between catalyst- and 
control-trials. At first glance, this appears to be in conflict with our hypothesis that when the die 
points to the option that feels wrong, dissatisfaction arises. However, dissatisfaction may also 
arise when the aid does not make a suggestion. As a result, dissatisfaction may be present in both 
catalyst- and control-trials, but for different reasons.  
 
STUDY 3 
 
Studies 1 and 2 show that an aid strengthens feelings when it acts as a catalyst. This 
occurred for two different aids, a coin and a die, and may therefore attest to generalizability. 
Building on this evidence, study 3 was designed to take the next step, namely to experimentally 
demonstrate that decision aids such as tossing a coin or rolling a die may influence decision 
processes and outcomes. To this end we selected a paradigm introduced by Hsee and 
Rottenstreich (2004) that allows differentiating whether a decision outcome is reached via 
rational calculation or affect-based valuation (see also Hsee, Rottenstreich, and Xiao 2005). In 
particular, when asked how much a specific object is worth, individuals can look at the facts and 
figures describing the object (a more rational approach). But they can also assess their feelings 
towards it (How-do-I-feel-about-it?). To differentiate these two pathways, Hsee and 
Rottenstreich (2004) asked participants how much they would donate for an endangered animal 
(e.g., a panda). Taking the rational approach, individuals may look at the quantitative aspect or 
scope and consider how many panda bears they are being asked to donate money for. In this case 
they determine value by calculation, and four pandas should receive a larger donation than one 
panda. Alternatively, taking the affect-based approach, individuals may consult their feelings 
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towards the target – how much do they like pandas? Here they determine value by affect, and 
may therefore help irrespective of the number of endangered animals.  
Hsee and Rottenstreich (2004) provided participants with either vivid or abstract 
information about the number of endangered pandas. They observed valuation-by-affect for 
pictures of pandas (vivid), but valuation-by-calculation when pandas were represented as dots in 
a table (abstract). Put differently, picture-participants donated a similar amount of money 
irrespective of the number of endangered animals, whereas dot-participants donated more for 
four compared to one panda.   
Study 3 mimics Hsee and Rottenstreich’s (2004) abstract dot-condition to show 
valuation-by-calculation in the control group. Because catalysts strengthen feelings as shown in 
studies 1 and 2, we further reasoned that catalyst-participants are likely to show valuation-by-
affect even when presented with abstract information. As a result, catalyst-participants should 
display a lower sensitivity towards numbers (i.e., a smaller difference between donation amounts 
for one or four animals) compared to the control group, just as Hsee and Rottenstreich’s (2004) 
picture group did.  
 
Method 
 
Participants and design.  The study was advertised as a study on Endangered Animals on 
the German online platform Workhub and took about five minutes to complete. Not knowing the 
effect sizes in this combination of paradigms, we followed study 1 and aimed for 40 participants 
per cell. Two hundred and twenty six individuals participated (139 male, 84 females, 1 other, 2 
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no answer; Mage = 32.76 years, SDage = 12.17). Participants received 0.60 € (approximately US$ 
0.60) as compensation. 
 We used a 3 (condition: catalyst vs. control-wheel vs. standard-control) x 2 (scope: one 
vs. four endangered animals) x 4 (animals: pandas vs. dolphins vs. elephants vs. polar foxes) 
mixed design, with the factor animals as repeated measures. The dependent variable was the 
amount of money donated for the animals. As the outcome in study 3 is a continuous dependent 
variable and not a binary one as in prior studies, we used a lottery wheel with 51 options (the 
number referred to possible donations between 0 and 50€) as catalyst. 
 
Materials and procedure. Participants received a link to the online study, gave informed 
consent, and learned from the instructions that we were interested in donation behavior regarding 
different animals. Before participants started, catalyst and control-wheel participants learned 
about a critical ingredient of the study: a lottery wheel. Participants learned that they would be 
asked to turn the wheel before making a decision. Catalyst-participants were told that the 
resulting number might elicit a helpful gut feeling. Control-wheel participants were told that they 
would need to remember the resulting number as we would be asking them about it later on. 
Standard-control participants did not see a lottery wheel and simply learned that some pages 
might take some time to load and were asked to be patient (the loading time was fixed to the time 
that the other groups needed to turn the lottery wheel). All participants were informed that we 
were interested in their donation behavior and would be asking them how much they would 
donate for one (four) exemplars of different endangered species. 
Subsequently, we asked participants to imagine that a team from the local zoological 
institute discovered some exemplars of an endangered species in a remote region. Half of the 
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participants were then offered the possibility to donate for one animal, the other half of 
participants for four animals. Remodeling Hsee and Rottenstreich’s (2004) valuation-by-
calculation condition, the number of animals was indicated by either one or four dots in a table. 
Catalyst and control-wheel-participants then turned the wheel and learned about the outcomes. 
Catalyst-participants were told that they may use this number as a recommendation and to check 
their gut feeling. Control-wheel-participants were asked to memorize the number. Standard 
control-participants simply saw a blank screen for 3 seconds (the time it took the other groups to 
turn the wheel). All participants then saw the table with the animal type and number of 
endangered animals again and were asked to indicate how much they would donate on a scale 
from 0€ to 50€ (in 5€ intervals). Control-wheel-participants were asked to enter the number that 
they had memorized before in an open text box.      
The first scenario contained pandas, the second dolphins, the third elephants, and the 
fourth polar foxes. At the end of the study, control-wheel-participants learned how many 
numbers had been memorized correctly, and we asked participants about their demographics 
(sex, age, German language proficiency, and education). We also asked about actual donation 
behavior for charity in general and for animals in specific in the last 12 months. Participants 
were thanked and were offered monetary compensation. 
 
Results 
 
Participants donated between 0 and 50€ for the different animals, with a grand mean of 
14.46€ (SD = 11.65). To test the hypotheses, we calculated a 3 (condition: catalyst vs. control-
wheel vs. standard-control) x 2 (scope: one vs. four animals) x 4 (animals) mixed ANOVA with 
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condition and scope as between factors and animals as within factor. Donation behavior was the 
dependent variable. We observed a significant main effect for animals, F(3, 660) = 2.70, 
p = .045, η2 = .012, indicating that donation behavior differed for different animals. In particular, 
mean donations for pandas were 14.71€ (SD = 12.80), for dolphins 14.94€ (SD = 12.91), for 
elephants 14.67€ (SD = 12.66), and for polar foxes 13.52€ (SD = 12.42; see appendix B for 
further details). We also observed a significant main effect for scope, F(1, 220) = 7.42, p = .007, 
η2 = .033, showing that overall participants donated more for four animals than for one animal.  
Crucially, the predicted interaction between condition and scope was observed, 
F(2, 220) = 3.33, p = .038, η2 = .029, suggesting that the conditions differed in their behavior in 
regards to scope (see figure 1). Replicating Hsee and Rottenstreich’s (2004) valuation-by-
calculation results, both control-wheel and standard-control-participants donated more money for 
four compared to one animal, F(1, 220) = 10.21, p = .002, η2 = .044 and F(1, 220) = 3.45, 
p = .065, η2 = .015, respectively. In contrast, catalyst-participants were less sensitive to scope, 
and donated a similar amount of money irrespective of the number of endangered exemplars, 
F < 1. This conceptually mimics Hsee and Rottenstreich’s (2004) valuation-by-affect group. All 
other main or interaction effects were not significant, all Fs < 2.60. 
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Figure 1. Donation behavior (in €) as a function of condition and scope (error bars reflect 
standard errors). 
 Further analyses. For anyone familiar with Tversky and Kahneman’s (1974) seminal 
work on anchoring, lottery wheels may be tightly associated with anchoring effects. As a result, 
the existence of anchoring effects may appear plausible. We used a two-pronged approach. First, 
to minimize anchoring effects ex ante, we fixed the outcome of the lottery to a constant equal for 
catalyst and control-wheel-participants (33 for pandas, 15 for dolphins, 23 for elephants, 29 for 
polar foxes). Second, we inspected the above-reported ANOVA from an anchoring perspective. 
Standard-control-participants were not provided with any anchor and therefore should differ in 
their donation behavior from both other groups, if anchoring occurred. We observed a non-
significant main effect for condition, F(2, 220) = 2.60, p = .077, η2 = .023. Post-hoc comparisons 
with Tukey HSD revealed a non-significant difference between the catalyst and standard-control, 
p = .161, and the control-wheel and standard-control, p = .091. Hence, by tendency, standard-
control-participants donated less money than catalyst and standard-control-participants. 
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Irrespective of this, however, our main result is that catalyst-participants were not affected by 
scope, which appears incompatible with an anchoring effect.  
 Readers may be further interested in the effects of donation behavior habits. To 
investigate, we included participants’ general and animal-specific donation habits as covariates 
in the above described analysis. We followed the procedure suggested by Muller, Yzerbyt, and 
Judd (2008) and checked for redundancy between the covariate and the independent variables by 
calculating the same mixed ANOVA with condition and scope as between factors and animals as 
within factor, but donation habits in general and specifically for animals as dependent variables 
(Yzerbyt, Muller, and Judd 2004). The analysis did not yield significant results (all Fs < 1.21), 
indicating no redundancy between the covariate and the independent variables. Therefore we 
calculated the mixed ANOVA with condition and scope as between factors and animals as within 
factor, but included reported donation habits in general and specifically for animals as two 
covariates. All main and interaction effects remained significant and effect sizes were of similar 
magnitude. 
 
Discussion 	
Study 3 was designed to demonstrate that individuals relying on catalysts use feelings to 
determine value. To this end, we relied on Hsee and Rottenstreich’s (2004) abstract (dot) 
condition, in which participants determine value by calculation. Because catalysts strengthen 
feelings as shown in Studies 1 and 2, we reasoned that catalyst-participants are likely to show 
valuation-by-affect even in the abstract (dot) condition. As a result, catalyst-participants should 
display a lower sensitivity towards numbers (i.e., a smaller difference between donation amounts 
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for one or four animals) compared to control groups. Results are in support, as catalyst-
participants donated a similar amount of money irrespective of the number of endangered 
animals, whereas participants in both control groups were sensitive to scope, that is, donated 
more money for four compared to one animal. We conclude from these results that catalysts may 
not only strengthen feelings (Studies 1 and 2), but that these feelings may influence decision-
making. Note that study 3 used yet a different decision aid—the lottery wheel—which again 
speaks for generalizability beyond the here employed methods.  
 
STUDY 4 
 
Study 3 suggests that using a catalyst may result in more affect-driven decision-making. 
In Hsee and Rottenstreich’s (2004) paradigm, reliance on affect is neither good nor bad. In fact, 
one could even argue that affect-driven decisions are less precise, as the information regarding 
number of endangered animals (scope) is not taken into account. In this situation, if one deemed 
scope an important variable, using a catalyst results in worse decisions. Yet, reliance on affect 
can result in both worse and better decisions, depending on the relation between the felt input 
and the decision target (Schwarz and Clore 2007). To investigate whether catalysts may not only 
affect but in some conditions even improve decision making, we selected a task in which reliance 
on feelings is said to increase the likelihood of beneficial decisions: the Iowa Gambling Task 
(IGT; Bechara et al. 1997; but for a different perspective see Maia and McClelland 2004). 
The IGT works as follows: IGT-participants draw 100 cards from four decks labeled A, 
B, C, and D. Each card carries a gain: 100 USD for decks A and B; 50 USD for decks C and D. 
Some cards also carry losses: For decks A and B, these losses are so high that they, in the long 
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run, outbalance the gains, resulting in net losses (A and B are therefore bad decks); in contrast, 
for decks C and D, the cumulated losses are lower than the cumulated gains, so that drawing 
cards from decks C and D leads to positive nets (good decks). Participants are not informed 
about these contingencies before the game, but are assumed to learn these while sampling from 
the four decks and looking at the feedback resulting from the choices they make. 
One IGT finding of particular interest here is that, on average, healthy participants decide 
advantageously after about 50 to 80 trials. Interestingly, they do so without being able to 
consciously explain why C and D are the better options, that is, they “decide advantageously 
before knowing the advantageous strategy” (Bechara et al. 1997). In particular, participants start 
to select more cards from the good decks around trials 20 (Bechara et al. 1994), but more 
pronouncedly make beneficial decisions from trials 50 onwards as they begin to express a hunch 
about the nature of the decks (Bechara et al. 1997). Presumably, this is because, between 10 and 
50 trials, feelings regarding the different decks develop, which then guide decisions before 
participants have a conscious understanding of the underlying contingencies. Apparently then, 
there is a window between about 20 to 50 decisions, in which healthy participants begin to 
generate feelings towards the risky choices before knowing what the risky choices are. If a 
catalyst strengthens feelings, its impact should be particularly apparent in this so-called pre-
hunch period.  
Against this background, we hypothesize that if a decision catalyst strengthens feelings, 
participants in the catalyst condition should show advantageous preferences at an earlier point in 
time compared to control-participants. Study 4 was designed to test this hypothesis. Notably, we 
stopped the IGT after 40 rounds (i.e., within the pre-hunch period), and asked for preference 
judgments after blocks of ten rounds to investigate changes over time.  
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Method  	
 Participants and design.  The study was conducted as an online study and advertised as 
Investment game on the German platform Workhub and took about eleven minutes to complete. 
Since the IGT has been subject to criticism (e.g. Maia and McClelland 2004), and since effect 
sizes in online studies are difficult to predict ex ante, we aimed for high power and recruited 308 
individuals (188 males, 114 females, 6 no answer; Mage = 30.66 years, SDage = 10.94). 
Participants received 2€ (approximately US$2) as compensation. 
 
 Design. We used an adaptation of the original IGT: a stock-market investment scenario 
created by Bollon and Bagneux (2013). Instead of using different decks of cards, the authors 
designed the study with four different companies, and participants could invest in these 
companies by buying stocks. Investing in a company corresponds to drawing a card, as in each 
round participants need to choose one company to invest in and then learn about the payoff (see 
Bagneux et al. 2013; Bollon and Bagneux 2013).  
Participants played the investment game for 40 rounds. In each round they were asked to 
choose one out of four companies, BUC, JOR, NEP, and KAM, that they wanted to invest in. 
Companies BUC and JOR (decks A and B in the original IGT) were associated with high gains 
but also high losses and on average resulted in net losses. Companies NEP and KAM (decks C 
and D in the original IGT) were associated with smaller gains, but also smaller losses, and on 
average resulted in net gains. After every ten rounds, participants were asked about their 
preference between two companies each, first between company BUC and NEP (decks A and C) 
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and then between JOR and KAM (decks B and D). This pairing made sure that participants 
always had to make a preference judgment between one good and one bad company and that the 
frequency of losses was stable within a single decision (BUC and NEP are both associated with 
frequent losses and JOR and KAM with infrequent losses). This choice was informed by a 
literature review pointing out that instead of preferring good to bad options, participants prefer 
infrequent losses over frequent losses (Steingroever et al. 2013). The type of judgment was 
coded as factor judgment type (pair one: BUC-NEP and pair two: JOR-KAM). As the game was 
played over 40 rounds, participants made four preference judgments: after 10, 20, 30, and 40 
rounds. This factor was coded as block (one to four). 
We therefore used a 2 (condition: catalyst vs. control) x 2 (judgment type: pair one vs. 
pair two) x 4 (block one to four) mixed design, with judgment type and block as repeated 
measures. The dependent variable was preference for the good versus bad company. For 
exploratory analysis we also assessed judgment certainty and ease of judgment making. 
Although we were mainly interested in participants’ preferences after the different experimental 
block, we also analyzed their choice behavior on a trial-by-trial basis. However, because the coin 
was tossed only after each block of ten trials, investigating the effect of a catalyst on trial-by-trial 
decision-making is not possible here.  
 
 Materials and procedure. Participants gave informed consent and learned from the 
instructions that they would be playing an investment game and would be asked to make 
investment choices over a course of time. The investment game was adapted from Bollon and 
Bagneux (2013). Each month (or trial) participants would be asked to choose from four 
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companies, BUC, JOR, NEP and KAM. Depending on market trends, the stock rates could rise 
and would result in winning money or could fall and would result in the loss of money.  
Participants were given a virtual starting capital of 2000€. Furthermore, they learned that 
in between the investment game trials, they would be asked about their preferences for the 
different companies and that the game would continue afterwards. Participants were asked to 
collect sufficient information on all companies and to make their preference judgments as 
quickly as possible. As a result, they should sample from all decks throughout the 40 rounds.  
Catalyst-participants then learned about an important ingredient in the study: a coin toss. 
Before each of the preference judgment, catalyst-participants would be asked to toss a coin, look 
at the outcome and assess their feelings towards the outcome. After that they would be asked to 
make their own judgment, which didn’t need to adhere to the coin’s suggestion. We used a 
computer simulated coin toss. Before starting the investment game, catalyst-participants were 
allowed to give the coin toss a try as often as they wanted. They were then informed about the 
meaning of the outcome of the coin toss - that heads would result in a suggestion of the right 
decision option, and tails of the left option, or vice versa.  
All participants then started the investment game and received feedback on their choices 
after every trial. After 10 rounds the investment game was paused. Catalyst-participants were 
then prompted to toss the coin, look at the outcome, and asked whether the outcome elicited a 
negative or positive feeling (1 = negative; 7 = positive). All participants were asked about their 
preferences – first for pair one and then for pair two. Moreover, all participants were asked how 
uncertain or certain they felt regarding their preference judgment (1 = very uncertain; 7 = very 
certain) and how difficult it was to make the preference judgment (1 = very difficult; 7 = very 
easy). Participants then continued with the investment game, and the above procedure was 
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repeated after trials 20, 30 and 40. To ensure that the first coin toss would result in the same 
suggestion for all participants, we fixed the outcome to the worse option. The outcomes of the 
remaining seven coin tosses were drawn randomly. 
At the end of the study, participants were asked about demographic information including 
gender and age. Furthermore, we asked about their knowledge regarding stock trading (1 = no 
knowledge at all; 7 = a lot of knowledge). Participants were thanked and received their 
compensation.    
 
Results 
 
 Of our 308 participants only 9 indicated having a good knowledge of stocks (scale points 
of 6 and higher). On average participants indicated having only little to moderate knowledge in 
regard to investments, M = 2.55, SD = 1.50.  
To assess preference in the investment game, we coded the preference for the better 
companies (NEP and KAM) as 1 and the preference for the worse companies (BUC and JOR) as 
-1. Preferences varied over all four blocks, after 10 trials: M = -.10, SD = .73; after 20 trials: 
M = .00, SD = .72; after 30 trials M = -.02, SD = .75; after 40 trials M = .05, SD = .79.  
 To test the hypotheses, we calculated a 2 (condition: catalyst vs. control) x 2 (judgment 
type: pair one vs. pair two) x 4 (block one to four) mixed ANOVA with condition as between 
factor and judgment type and block as within factors. Preference was the dependent variable. We 
selected a mixed ANOVA despite the fact that the dependent variable is dichotomous, since the 
mixed ANOVA allows for parsimoniously testing a repeated design and is known to be robust 
against violations of its assumptions (Ito 1980; Wilcox 1993).  To correct for sphericity for 
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within factors in our data, we report the Huynh-Feldt estimate in the following section. Results 
reveal a significant main effect for block, F(2.87, 918) = 3.33, p = .021,  η2 = .011, as preference 
differed across the different blocks in the investment games. Importantly, this main effect was 
qualified by the predicted interaction between block and condition, F(3, 918) = 3.19, p = .023, 
η2 = .010. The interaction pattern, see figure 2, displays that while the control-participants’ 
preference remains at chance level, catalyst-participants show a change and prefer the 
objectively better companies more often at the end of the investment game. Simple effects 
analyses are in support, as after 40 trials preferences significantly differ between catalyst and 
control-participants, F(1, 306) = 6.27, p = .013, η2 = .020. All other main effects and interaction 
effects are not significant, all Fs < 1.68. 
 
Figure 2. Preference for the better companies as a function of condition and decision number 
(error bars reflect standard errors). 
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 Additional analysis. Alternatively to our prediction, one could also ask if catalyst-
participants simply preferred the option that the coin was pointing to, as an anchoring effect 
might have occurred (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). To rule out this possibility we calculated a 
new variable called coin validity, which was set to 1, if the coin pointed to the worse option, and 
2, if the coin pointed to the better option. We then calculated a t-test for the different judgments 
with preference as dependent variable. Results were significant only for pair two after 10 trials, 
t(150) = -2.27, p = .024, indicating a tendency for participants to prefer the better option more 
often, if the coin pointed to it. All other t-tests did not indicate any significant results (all 
ts < |1.16|), therefore we conclude that anchoring is not a sufficient explanation for the obtained 
effects.        
 
Certainty and ease of judgment. We also tested, in an exploratory fashion, if using a 
catalyst not only affects preference judgments but also perceived certainty and ease of judgment 
formation. Both evaluations could also be seen as feelings (certainty and ease) that might be 
strengthened by using a catalyst. To investigate this idea we tested whether conditions differed 
regarding judgment certainty and found a significant main effect for condition, F(1, 306) = 9.00, 
p = .003, η2 = .029: Catalyst-participants felt more certain in regards to their judgments 
compared to control-participants (M = 4.94 and M = 4.54, respectively; see table 1 for more 
details).   
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Table 1 
Means and standard deviations of judgment certainty and ease of judgment, separately for 
condition, judgment type, and block. 
 Pair one Pair two 
 Catalyst Control Catalyst Control 
Judgment certainty 
Block M SD M  SD M SD M  SD 
1 4.80 1.49 4.06 1.81 4.72 1.61 4.26 1.84 
2 4.95 1.59 4.60 1.81 5.05 1.55 4.80 1.76 
3 4.99 1.54 4.53 1.79 5.13 1.55 4.79 1.63 
4 4.88 1.54 4.44 1.71 5.01 1.54 4.82 1.73 
Ease of judgment 
1 4.72 1.56 4.22 1.76 4.66 1.66 4.26 1.83 
2 4.79 1.51 4.54 1.75 4.85 1.59 4.78 1.70 
3 4.84 1.58 4.50 1.73 5.01 1.60 4.61 1.66 
4 4.71 1.58 4.28 1.69 5.00 1.57 4.65 1.71 
 
Similarly we found a significant main effect for condition on perceived ease, 
F(1, 306) = 6.37, p = .012, η2 = .020, showing that catalyst-participants felt the judgments were 
easier to make compared to the control group (see table 1 for more details). 
Sampling behavior. To analyze the variability in sampling (selecting the different 
companies), we calculated the mean proportion of choices in percent from the good and the bad 
companies overall. When comparing catalyst and control-participants regarding mean 
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proportions for good and bad companies, we did not find any differences: on average, catalyst-
participants chose to invest in good companies in 45.21% of trials (SD = 18.40) and control-
participants in 44.12 % of trials (SD = 19.12), t(306) < 1. Perhaps this reflects that participants 
were instructed to sample from the companies such that they could draw well-informed 
preference judgments. Note that the trial-by-trial sampling decisions were not preceded by coin 
tosses, so that no differences as a function of the catalyst were hypothesized. Interestingly, the 
fact that sampling was similar across conditions rules out the potential alternative explanation 
that differential conceptual knowledge played an active role. 
 
Discussion 
 
Study 4 indicates that using a catalyst can result in more advantageous decision 
preferences. In particular, after 40 IGT rounds, catalyst-participants showed a stronger 
preference for good companies compared to control-participants. Next to this stronger preference 
after the end of the game, catalyst-participants were also more certain with regard to their 
decision and found them to be easier to make. One way to look at this is that certainty and ease 
are also feelings, which might be strengthened by using the decision aid as a catalyst. Yet, in this 
case, both feelings of certainty and uncertainty should be stronger and cancel each other out 
when results are analyzed on the aggregate level, which is not compatible with the here observed 
main effect in the catalyst-condition. We therefore prefer a second perspective: As participants 
feel what they prefer and can make decisions based on their feelings, this increases certainty and 
perceived ease. 
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Catalyst-participants’ stronger preference for the good companies occurred in the course 
of the pre-hunch period (Bechara et al. 1997), where feelings towards the different options, but 
not declarative knowledge about the game’s logic, should have developed. In support of this 
reasoning, control-participants had not developed a preference for the better companies. This 
pattern cannot be explained by different experiences or knowledge throughout the game, as 
sampling behavior did not differ between catalyst and control-participants across the four blocks. 
It should be mentioned that the role of feelings in the IGT has been debated. Maia and 
McClelland (2004), for instance, suggest that the somatic marker hypothesis might not suffice to 
explain the obtained results and assume that the IGT promotes explicit reasoning. They provide 
support that participants have more knowledge about the game than implied by Bechara et al. 
(1997). On the other hand, based on a review of the literature, Turnbull, Bowmann, Shanker, and 
Davies (2014) suggest that knowledge (or conscious awareness) is readily achieved, but in form 
of an unfocused emotion-based gut-feeling. It thus seems that even if knowledge is accrued, 
feelings still seem to be an important factor in advantageous IGT decisions.  
Summing up, study 4 suggests that catalysts may not only increase reliance on affect in 
decision preferences, but also may prove advantageous. Notably, this should only be the case in 
circumstances where feelings are a valid input, as further discussed below.  
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
The present research’s objective was to investigate how commonly used decision-making 
aids with random outcomes, such as a coin-toss or a die, may influence decision-making. Such 
aids lead to clear results, but interestingly individuals do not necessarily follow the aids’ 
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suggestion. Instead, individuals report experiencing a feeling in reaction to the aid’s suggestion, 
and then make their own decision. Putting this anecdotal evidence to test, we here propose that 
decision aids function as catalysts, which render the decision quasi-factual, that is, as if decided. 
Out of all possible outcomes, a choice has been made, which is not binding, but nevertheless can 
feel very real. As a result, decision options may be imagined more vividly and with more details, 
and elicit stronger affective reactions, that impact subsequent decision processes. 
Four studies were designed to test the notion of catalyzing decisions. Study 1 provides 
first experimental evidence that flipping a coin may strengthen feelings. Specifically, catalyst- 
compared to control-participants reported stronger immediate feelings of which option they 
would (not) prefer. Study 2 replicates study 1 with a different catalyst, and furthermore rules out 
alternative explanations with regard to the control group. Study 3 demonstrates that individuals 
relying on catalysts use feelings to determine value. In particular, adapting a paradigm 
introduced by Hsee and Rottenstreich (2004), we observed that control-participants are sensitive 
to numeric scope—donating more money for a higher number of endangered animals, 
presumably because they derive value by calculation—, whereas catalyst-participants were 
scope-insensitive—donating a similar amount of money irrespective of the number of 
endangered animals, presumably because they derive value from affect. Finally, study 4 indicates 
that using a catalyst does not only increase the reliance on affect, but can result in preferences for 
objectively more advantageous decision options. In particular, using a stock-market variant of 
the Iowa Gambling Task (Bollon and Bagneux 2013), catalyst- compared to control-participants 
developed a stronger preference for the good companies (decks). Next to this stronger 
preference, catalyst-participants were also more certain with regard to their judgments and found 
them to be easier to make. 
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All in all, four studies show that relying on decision aids may strengthen feelings, which 
may then influence subsequent decision processes and outcomes. The four studies used different 
decision aids and relied on various methodological paradigms, with the aim of attesting to the 
results’ generalizability.    
 
Becoming quasi-factual 
 
The present notion of catalyzing decisions receives conceptual support from a variety of 
existing studies. We assume that when using a catalyst (e.g., a coin toss), the decision becomes 
quasi-factual, as if decided, as the coin toss points to one option over the other. Quasi-factual 
may alternatively be referred to as less hypothetical. According to Construal Level Theory, 
hypotheticality is one dimension of psychological distance (Trope and Liberman 2010). Several 
lines of research suggest that when psychological distance is reduced, feelings towards decision 
options are strengthened. For instance, Williams and Bargh (2008) observed that individuals 
primed with proximity compared to distance were more affectively moved when reading an 
embarrassing self-disclosure. Other studies have shown that psychological distance affects the 
importance of feelings in a decision process. In a study by Freitas, Salovey, and Liberman 
(2001), participants were more likely to prefer a positive but not diagnostic assessment compared 
to a negative, diagnostic one when it was expected in the close future. Feeling good, by being 
able to avoid negative social comparisons or thinking about one’s own liabilities, was prioritized 
over superordinate concerns of self-improvement (see also Liberman and Trope 2008). 
The aim of this paper was to investigate how spontaneous affective reactions in response 
to a catalyst may affect decision processes and outcomes. This does not, however, exclude the 
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possibility that catalysts may trigger more deliberative cognitive processes. According to 
Construal Level Theory (Trope and Liberman 2010), reduced distance is associated with lower 
levels of cognitive construal, that is, with less abstract and more concrete mental representations 
(Liberman and Trope 1998; Trope and Liberman 2003). When construing at a low level, 
individuals assign more weight to details, to subordinate information, to cons, and considerations 
about feasibility (Trope and Liberman 2010). Since using the catalyst can be seen as bringing 
decision objects closer, one could argue that individuals should construe on lower levels, which 
may result, for instance, in the consideration of more details or giving more weight to cons. For 
instance, in study 4, one could argue that catalyst participants construed the different companies 
on lower levels and therefore integrated both positive and negative information into their 
preference judgments. At the same time, the observation that catalyst-participants considered less 
information in study 3 is not easily compatible with a cognitive framing. On a speculative note, 
we suggest that both affective and cognitive processes may be triggered by the catalyst. Future 
research may fruitfully address the cognitive aspects, and also investigate to which extent 
implications of affective and cognitive processes align or diverge.   
 
Broader implications: when to use a catalyst? 
 
Helping individuals to make difficult decisions, especially when they are undecided, may 
prove beneficial both on the individual and on the societal level. For instance, signing up for 
insurance or choosing a financial savings plan for retirement are important decisions that are 
difficult to make and individuals might postpone making them as long as possible. The Annual 
Report of the Social and Behavioral Sciences Team (Executive Office of the President, National 
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Science and Technology Council) points out that federal policies support the goal of retiring with 
financial security by encouraging private savings, protecting workplace pensions, and providing 
Social Security retirement benefits. Nevertheless, data suggests that making the decision is 
difficult: only 42 percent of active duty service members make the decision to participate in the 
Thrift Savings Plan (TSP). This number is especially interesting when comparing it to the 
number of Civilian Federal employees, who are automatically enrolled and have to opt out if 
they do not want to participate, where 87% participate (National Science and Technology 
Council 2015). Not making the decision results in a reduced amount of savings for the 
individuals, as interests and compound interests are forfeited, and higher risks for society, as the 
public may need to cover for gaps in individual saving plans. Moreover, not making the decision 
may produce a very aversive and unpleasant state. If using a catalyst enables individuals to make 
difficult decisions where they were undecided before and would have postponed making a 
choice, they and society may benefit on the levels of finance and well-being.  
Nonetheless, the specific circumstances under which the use of a catalyst can be 
beneficial need to be further researched. We assume that using a catalyst strengthens feelings, 
and others have suggested that relying on feelings can influence and even improve decision-
making (Gigerenzer 2007). However, it is important to note that feelings can serve as a basis of 
accurate as well as mistaken inferences, depending on the relationship between feelings and the 
target (Schwarz and Clore 2007). Feelings may prove beneficial, for instance, when sufficient 
background knowledge is possessed, in that individuals who trust their feelings can predict 
outcomes of future events better than individuals with lower trust in feelings (Pham, Lee, and 
Stephen 2012). Relatedly, in the IGT, feelings as somatic markers are assumed to provide valid 
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decision input about which decks are to be avoided (Bechara et al. 1997). In sum, if decision 
quality benefits from including feelings, using a catalyst can be advantageous.  
Interestingly, above, we have discussed the benefits of using a catalyst in terms of 
decision accuracy. But it would seem that there are other ways of being beneficial, too, as study 
4 suggests. In particular, the exploratory analyses in study 4 revealed that catalyst-participants do 
not only prefer the objectively better companies/decks, but are also more certain about their 
judgments and found them easier to make. It seems that as participants feel what they prefer and 
can make decisions based on their feelings, this increases certainty and perceived ease. 
Reversely, post-decisional regret and dissonance may be decreased. However, in the case where 
considering feelings lead to less accurate decisions (see above), increased certainty and ease, and 
less regret and dissonance, could prove treacherous. However, it is not always normatively 
obvious what the better decision or judgment is. Consider opting for a healthy diet and therefore 
giving up on yummy but unhealthy food choices. Is it better to increase the probability for a 
longer life, or to enjoy life as much as one can today? This example illustrates that with respect 
to accuracy, the normative better option is not always obvious, given that the future is uncertain. 
The psychological benefit of not being doubtful or unsatisfied, however, persists even in 
decisions such as these. Speculating further, decision certainty or ease could even constitute one 
reason as to why individuals use a decision-making aid with a random outcome in the first place: 
although they do not know if their decision benefits from using a catalyst, considering their 
feelings may ease the decision process and increase certainty in regard to the outcome.  
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A: Screenshots of setup in study 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 43	
Appendix B: Descriptive statistics from study 3. 
 
Means and standard deviations of donation behavior (in €), separately for condition, scope and 
animals. 
  Catalyst Control-wheel Standard-control 
Animals Scope M SD M SD M SD 
Panda 
1 17.16 15.12 12.16 12.45 9.615 9.28 
4 14.88 10.41 20.56 14.58 14.32 12.26 
Dolphin 
1 16.35 13.26 13.24 13.65 9.74 10.82 
4 14.88 10.77 19.72 13.25 16.08 14.20 
Elephant 
1 15.27 11.72 11.62 11.37 11.54 12.52 
4 15.00 11.04 20.56 13.46 14.32 14.35 
Polar fox 
1 14.87 12.61 10.14 11.58 7.95 7.84 
4 15.00 11.15 20.14 13.23 13.38 14.38 
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